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Preserving Normal Heterosexual Male
Fantasy: The "Severe or Pervasive" MissedInterpretation of Sexual Harassment in the

Absence of a Tangible Job Consequence
e. christi cunninghamt

Rape is fun, for the rapist. When individuals exercise power
to obtain sex, they enjoy it. Sexual harassment, whether explicitly sexual or not, is the exercise of power, and harassers enjoy it.1
The difference between severe or pervasive sexual harassment
and mild or sporadic sexual harassment is simply a matter of degree.
If harassers enjoy harassing and liberty means having freedom from government interference to do to whomever you want,
whatever you want, whenever you want, then Title VIP curtails
liberty. Liberty, however, has never meant that. Title VII, including sexual harassment law, does not curtail liberty because
liberty is not doing to whomever, whatever, whenever. Liberty
does not include subordinating others. Even when the country
was founded, the freedom to do whatever, whenever, extended
t Associate Professor, Howard University School of Law; former associate Debevoise
& Plimpton, New York; former law clerk, Honorable Constance Baker Motley, SDNY; J.D.
1992, Yale University. I would like to thank Francisco Valdes, Mary Anne Case, Katherine Franke, Adrienne Davis, Andrew Taslitz, Kurt Hamrock, Elaine Home and Alyson
Felder for their comments, suggestions, and support. I would also like to thank the editors
of The University of Chicago Legal Forum and my research assistants B.J. Chisholm,
David Woodard, and Kimberly Hicks for their tireless efforts.
See Catharine A- MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment:Its First Decade in Court, in
Feminism Unmodified 111 (Harvard 1987):
[Women] cannot bear to have their personal account of sexual abuse reduced to a fantasy they invented, used to define them and to pleasure the
finders of fact and the public. I think they have a very real sense that
their accounts are enjoyed, that others are getting pleasure from the
first-person recounting of their pain.
Throughout this Article, I argue that while sex is a fantasy, sexual abuse and the harm of
the unwelcomed imposition of fantasy is real regardless of its frequency or severity.
2 Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids an employer "to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such individual's ... sex." Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 241, 255 (1964),
codified at 42 USC § 2000-2(a)(1) (1994).
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only to owners' treatment of their African and Native American
slaves.3 Despite their subordinated status, white women and nonChristian servants had limited protections from the arbitrary
treatment of others,4 and certainly free, Christian, propertyowning men faced restrictions in their treatment of each other.
Drucilla Cornell suggests that liberty often conflicts with equality
when some individuals are not viewed as fully human:
If, in fact, a politically liberal state's only legitimacy stems
from the recognition of basic rights to persons, what is at
stake, certainly for adult women, is then whether they can
continue to participate in societies in which they are
treated as anything less than full persons. The demand
that the moral community expand the class of those included initially as persons, is utopian only to the extent
that it conflicts with basic patriarchal institutions. As
Jacques Derrida has argued, it is the logic of carnophallologocentrism, where the sacrifice of interests of others helps to prop up the very idea of the phallic man, that
limits who is then qualified as people. This propping up of
the phallic man, however, can hardly be a legitimate state
project in a politically liberal society.'
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was recognition of some of the "basic
rights" of persons.' Title VII, as part of the 1964 Act, was enacted
to protect certain liberty interests.7 However, the courts' severe or
pervasive standard sacrifices the interest of women (and men) in
working without being sexually harassed, unless that harassment rises to the "extreme"8 level of being severe or pervasive.
See Charles Johnson and Patricia Smith, Africans in America: America's Journey
through Slavery 8 (Harcourt Brace 1998) (discussing African and Native American slavery).
. See Jacqueline Jones, American Work 62-80 (1998) (describing the dismal treatment of non-Christian laborers whose obligations were defined by indenture contracts);
Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective, 51 Stan
L Rev 221, 226 (1999) (comparing "rights" of white women and black women in
antebellum).
Drucilla Cornell, Are Women Persons?,3 Animal L 7, 9 (1997) (emphasis added).
' Colleen Sheppard, Equality Rights and InstitutionalChange: Insights From Canada and the United States, 15 Ariz J Intl & Comp Law 143, 144 (1998) (describing passage
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a benchmark in domestic human rights legislation).
' Note, Multiple Masculinities: A New Vision for Same-Sex Harassment Law, 34
Harv CR-CL L Rev 577, 589-90 (1999) (framing sexual harassment as a denial of a liberty
interest).
' Faragherv City of Boca Raton, 118 S Ct 2275, 2284 (1998) ("We have made it clear
that conduct must be extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment").
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This standard is contrary to the principles of the statute as well
as the express language of the of the statute as amended. The
severe or pervasive standard protects a fantasy of normal male
sexuality against the interests of others. This propping up cannot
be a legitimate state function.
Some civil libertarian concerns regarding the effects of antidiscrimination law are based on assumptions of scarcity and zero
sum calculations.9 Critics often reason as if freedom were finite more civil rights for some necessitate fewer civil liberties for others." Arguments that frame sexual harassment questions in
terms of balancing interests assume that one person's gain is
necessarily weighed against another's loss. However, if the imposition of sex on others is not a liberty interest, then no balancing
is required. Linda Greene observes:
The First Amendment concerns raised in the context of
sexual harassment regulation are legitimate and important ones, but their constitutional valence adds weight to
the growing chorus of objections to continued equality efforts. We may observe a trend in discursive strategies that
transforms all discussions of inclusion of historically excluded people into a discussion about the harm to historically privileged people .... These sound-bite discursive
strategies provide effective ideological cover to proponents
of a limited version of equality that tolerates token entry
but nonetheless requires submission to subordinating
practices. 1 '
The perception that equality requires a negative trade-off with
liberty is false. If Congress makes a statutory investment to increase the total sum of liberties in the workplace, then Congress

See, for example, Martin D. Carcieri, A ProgressiveReply to the ACLU on Proposition 209, 39 Santa Clara L Rev 141, 150 (1998) ("Former United States Attorney General
Richard Thornburgh recently summed it up, 'it's a zero-sum game: when one person is
favored because of race another is disfavored because of race.") (citation omitted).
0 See, for example, Note, Including Gender in Bias Crime Statutes: Feminist and
Evolutionary Perspectives,3 Wm & Mary J Women & L 277, 290-91 (1997) ("According to
the dominance theory, cultural and sexual domination of men structures social and legal
relations between the sexes. The exertion of power is often a result of zero-sum thinking, a
growing trend in our society. People view desired resources and statuses as being limited;
in other words, the pie cannot increase, it can only be divided up among the various competitors.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
" Linda S. Greene, Sexual HarassmentLaw and the FirstAmendment, 71 Chi Kent
L Rev 729, 739-40 (1995).
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has increased, rather than abridged, liberty and created
equality.12
If, however, we assume that the harasser's ability to harass
is a liberty interest, then there are three jurisprudential possibilities for appropriate state action. The first option looks to the
fact that the harasser and the victim of harassment are private
actors and concludes that they should both be free from statutory
government intervention.13 The second option posits a false conflict between liberty and equality and suggests that the liberty
interests of the sexual aggressor and the equality interests of the
victim should be balanced. Thus, the sexual aggressor's entertainment from harassing should be conditional. He should only be
permitted to exercise power for sex under certain circumstances
if he is the victim's co-worker, or if the harassment is expressive, or if the harassment is not violent, or if the victim does not
report it, or if the harassment is part of some religious practice,
or if the victim dresses provocatively, or if the harassment is not
severe or only occurs occasionally. The third possibility for appropriate state action protects women's (and men's) liberty interest
in being free from perpetrators' enjoyment of the exercise of
power for sex, absolutely. This third option defines sex equality.
As long as men's enjoyment of the exercise of power for the sake
of sex supersedes women's right to be free from that exercise of
power, there is no sex equality. This includes the use of power,
however conditioned and to whatever degree, when it is used because of sex. This Article argues that there is a jurisprudential
and statutory mandate for the third option and that the severe or
pervasive standard operates contrary to that mandate. 4
The Supreme Court's decisions from the 1998 Term on sexual
harassment reaffirmed the severe or pervasive standard originating in Harrisv Forklift Systems, Inc 5 and the landmark Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson."s In Meritor, the Court estab'" But see Nadine Strossen, Regulating Workplace Sexual Harassment and Upholding the FirstAmendment - Avoiding a Collision, 37 Vill L Rev 757, 758 (1992) ("allowing
broader regulation of workplace sexual harassment... could well undermine rather than
advance women's equality").
* See Richard Epstein, ForbiddenGrounds (Harvard 1992).
* See also Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 Stan L Rev 813, 843-47 (1991) (critiquing
severe or pervasive standard); B. Glenn George, The Back Door: Legitimizing Sexual Harassment Claims, 73 BU L Rev 1, 20-26 (1993) (same).
" 510 US 17 (1993). Harris, the case which purportedly clarified the parameters of
the hostile work environment claim, was similarly conservative, concluding that "Title VII
comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous breakdown." Id at 22.
" 477 US 57 (1986).
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lished that sexual harassment is sex discrimination.17 Nevertheless, the Court held that only sexual harassment that is sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the terms or conditions of
employment constitutes an unlawful employment practice. 8 The
Court attempted to clarify this standard in Harris, concluding
that while the harassment need not be so severe as to cause the
plaintiff to suffer a mental breakdown, it must be objectively severe or pervasive, and the plaintiff must experience it as such. 9
In its decisions from the 1998 Term, the Court noted that, in
the absence of a tangible job consequence, sexual harassment
must be severe or pervasive to be actionable. ° The Court explained that the requirement that sexual harassment be severe
or pervasive is necessary in order to prevent the statute from
"expanding into a general civility code."' According to the Court,
the statute does not address "genuine but innocuous differences
in the ways men and women routinely interact with members of
the same sex and of the opposite sex."22 Only conduct "so objectively offensive" as to alter the conditions of employment and create an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile
or abusive is prohibited by the statute.23
I argue in this Article that the severe or pervasive standard
reaffirmed by the Court during the 1998 term constitutes the doctrinal and jurisprudential reification of sex inequality in the
workplace. I demonstrate that the severe or pervasive standard,
viewed from varying interpretative positions, is inconsistent with
the statute and is contrary to the 1991 Amendments to the Civil
Rights Act. I also demonstrate that the courts' failure to address
many forms of sexual harassment is a result of a judicial proximity analysis24 which limits the reach of the statute to conduct that
is outside of a fantasized zone of normal (white) heterosexual
male conduct.25 Thus, the scope of current sex discrimination law
Id at 66-67.
Id at 67 ("For sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or
pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive
working enviromnent.") (citation omitted).
Harris,510 US at 21-23.
Burlington Industries v Ellerth, 118 S Ct 2257, 2264 (1998) ("For any sexual harassment preceding the employment decision to be actionable, however, the conduct must
be severe or pervasive.").
" Oncale v Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc, 523 US 75, 81 (1998).
Id.
23

Id.

See text accompanying notes 150-52.
By referring to the "norm" or what is "ordinary" or 'common," I am in no way condoning an idea that any particular conception of sex is normal or natural. In fact, I am
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is a function of the degree to which the sex discrimination is essential to the ordinary exercise of power underlying the male heterosexual fantasy.
Part I discusses the meaning of discrimination "because of
sex," arguing that sex is a fantasy and that problems of
(dis)aggregation noted by some scholars could also be viewed as
problems of the proximity of notions of sex to the image of normal
heterosexual male behavior. Part II discusses the severe or pervasive standard and demonstrates that it was invalidated by the
1991 Amendment to the Civil Rights Act, and using alternate
theories of interpretation, that it is inconsistent with this statute.
Part III outlines how the severe or pervasive standard conflicts
with conclusions regarding employer liability reached by the
Court in the 1998 decisions. Part IV proposes the following
framework for evaluating sexual harassment that is consistent
with the statute: In the absence of a tangible job consequence,
where there is direct evidence of sexual harassment that is a motivating factor affecting the terms, conditions or privileges of an
individual's employment by an employer (including the employer's supervisor), whether or not the sexual harassment is severe or pervasive, then the employer would be liable. The damages available to the plaintiff would be limited by the terms of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991.26 An employer may establish an affirmative defense where the employer proves that it has created a
sexually equal workplace.
I. "BECAUSE OF... SEX"
7
Sexual harassment is discrimination "because of... sex.2
But what is "sex?" In this part, I seek to accomplish two objectives. First, I explain a commonality in the theories of Professors
Katherine Franke, Vicki Schultz, Mary Anne Case, and Francisco
Valdes regarding the inadequacy of sex discrimination law. Specifically, I argue that the following four theories all concern the
same problem, namely, courts' application of the nature and parameters of "sex": (1) the failure of sex discrimination law due to

suggesting the contrary - that sex is fantasy. I argue that a particular viewpoint (that of
white heterosexual men) is protected or privileged by the severe or pervasive standard,
thus adopting a norm or what the Court refers to as that which is "genuine but innocuous." Oncale, 523 US at 81.
' 42 USC § 1981(a) (1994) (allowing compensatory and punitive damages, but capping them at varying amounts between $50,000 and $300,000 according to the number of
persons employed by the defendant).
27 Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson, 477 US 57, 66-67 (1986).
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the disaggregation of sex from gender,28 (2) the failure of sex discrimination law due to the disaggregation of sexual and "nonsexual" harassment,29 (3) the failure of sex discrimination law due
to the conflation of gender with sex and sexual orientation," and
(4) the failure of sex discrimination law due to the disaggregation
of sex, gender, and sexual orientation.31 Second, I propose a definition of "sex" as fantasy.
My intention is to incorporate, within this definition, conceptions of sex as sexual desire, biological designation, gender, and
sexuality. While sex is fantasy, the harms of imposed fantasy are
very real. As part of my definition of sex as fantasy, I propose a
definition of sexual harassment as the (unwelcomed)32 imposition
of a particular fantasy by the harasser. 3 I argue that courts have
interpreted Title VII protections to vary with the degree to which
the imposition of a particular fantasy of sex facilitates or is necessary to common heterosexual male sexual desire. In other
words, the severe or pervasive standard functions to protect a
fantasy of normal behavior from the reach of the statute. Courts,
through the severe or pervasive standard, prohibit some conduct,
such as force or touching, while allowing other conduct based on
the proximity of the conduct to a fantasy of normal male heterosexuality. The failures described by these theories would be addressed by prohibiting any imposition of fantasy, rather than
See generally Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination
Law: The Disaggregationof Sex from Gender, 144 U Pa L Rev 1 (1995).
See generally Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment,107 Yale L J
1683 (1998); see also Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment? 49
Stan L Rev 691 (1997).
' Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructingthe Conflation of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation"in Euro-American Law and Society, 83
Cal L Rev 1 (1995).
" See generally Mary Anne C. Case, DisaggregatingGender from Sex and Sexual
Orientation:The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 Yale L J 1
(1995).
' I am not unambivalent about the "unwelcomeness" element in sexual harassment.
Many scholars have criticized it. See, for example, Martha Chamallas, Writing About
Sexual Harassment: A Guide to the Literature, 4 UCLA Women's L J 37, 44-45 (1993)
(discussing unwelcomeness requirement); Estrich, 43 Stan L Rev at 826-34 (cited in note
14) (same); Mary F. Radford, By Invitation Only: The Proof of Welcomeness in Sexual
HarassmentCases, 72 NC L Rev 499, 524-43 (1994) (same); Note, Did She Ask for It?: The
"Unwelcome" Requirement in Sexual Harassment Cases, 77 Cornell L Rev 1558, 1574-92
(1992) (same). My point is merely that where sex is imposed, liability should not turn on
the degree of imposition.
Everyone has fantasies. I focus, in this Article, primarily on the fantasies of sexual
harassers and courts because it is their shared fantasies that the severe or pervasive
standard preserves. By this focus, I do not intend to ignore the fantasies of others; rather,
I intend to create space for them by identifying the ways in which courts have privileged
certain imposed fantasies.
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conditioning the prohibition according to common heterosexual
male sexual pleasure. The severe or pervasive standard is an example of the Court's balancing of sex discrimination and an individual's freedom from it according to the proximity of the discrimination to common heterosexual male sexual pleasure.
Eliminating the severe or pervasive standard would be a step toward realizing the statutory goal of workplace equality.
A. Aggregating and Disaggregating Sex
One of the central questions plaguing society and even the
President at the end of the twentieth century is: "What counts as
sex?" This question is the common problem addressed by several
of the leading sex discrimination scholars. Their theories demonstrate the ways in which courts permit various forms of discrimination because they are not considered acts based on "sex," as
envisioned by the courts. In this Article, I contend that the collective concerns of these theories would be addressed if the courts
were to apply a definition of sex as fantasy.
1. Definitions.
The meanings of the operative terms are by no means unambiguous. Professor Francisco Valdes discusses many of the inconsistencies and conflations in the uses of the terms "sex," "gender,"
and "sexual orientation." 4 For example, he discusses the confusion of (physical and biological) sex with "penis" or "vagina."3" The
confusion, according to Valdes, has been the assumption that the
presence or absence of a vagina or penis determines the sex of a
person." As Valdes notes, however, genitalia are only one of several elements cumulatively considered to constitute sex. 3 7 Like

Valdes, 31 I recognize that sex commonly denotes physical attributes of the body - external genitalia for men and internal and
external genitalia for women; however, categorizations based on
physical differences, including genitalia, may be ideological
choices.39 I, therefore, generally refer to what is traditionally understood as sex as biological or physical sex.40
See Valdes, 83 Cal L Rev at 20-23 (cited in note 30).
Id at 20.
Id.
37 Id.
Valdes, 83 Cal L Rev at 21 (cited in note 30).
See notes 48-72 and accompanying text.
o As Valdes notes, there are several elements cumulatively considered to constitute
sex, including chromosomal sex, antigenic sex, gonadal sex, prenatal hormonal sex, internal morphologic sex, external morphologic sex, pubertal hormonal sex, and assigned sex.
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"Gender," as both Valdes and Case discuss, is often confused
with biological sex.41 Gender generally refers to social or cultural
traits such as feminine or masculine.42 Nevertheless, the term
gender is sometimes used as a polite way of saying biological
sex.43 This civility, however, conflates traditional understandings
of what is biological and what is cultural." The reconceptualization that I propose views gender as part of what is sex yet recognizes that biological sex and gender are different forms of the social construction of sex.
"Sexual orientation," as I use it, refers to the affectional interests of individuals. As Valdes notes, sexual orientation is distinct from sexual conduct.45 Although some research suggests that
sexual orientation may be attributable to biology,4 it is not necessarily static, just as biology is not necessarily static.47 The reconceptualization that I propose recognizes sexual orientation as
another aspect of sex.
2. The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender Impedes Workplace Equality.
In her article, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination
Law: The Disaggregationof Sex From Gender, Professor KatherSee Valdes, 83 Cal L Rev at 20 (cited in note 30), citing John Money, Gay, Straight, and
In-Between 28-29 (Oxford 1988). For purposes of this Article, I do not identify any particular element as determinative of physical or biological sex.
" Valdes, 83 Cal L Rev at 20; Case, 105 Yale L J at 9-18 (cited in note 30).
'4 See Valdes, 83 Cal L Rev at 21; Case, 105 Yale L J at 10-11.
' See Case, 105 Yale L J at 10. Case explains that Justice Ginsburg began using the
term gender instead of sex because "'the word "sex" may conjure up improper images of
what occurs in porno theaters.' Id, quoting Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender in the Supreme
Court: 1973 and 1974 Term, 1975 Sup Ct Rev 1, 1 n 1.
" See Valdes, 83 Cal L Rev at 21-22; Case, 105 Yale L J at 10. See also Franke, 144
U Pa L Rev at 34-35 (cited in note 28) (illustrating the conflation of the male body with
masculine norms).
Valdes, 83 Cal L Rev at 22 (cited in note 30).
' See Science Notebook, Wash Post A7 (Apr 5, 1999) (scientific studies suggest that
homosexual and bisexual women may differ biologically from heterosexual women); Curt
Suplee, Study ProvidesNew Evidence of 'Gay Gene', Wash Post Al (Oct 31, 1995); but see
Rick Weiss, Research Casts Doubt on 'Gay Gene' Theory; Study Finds Nothing Within X
Chromosome That PredictsMale Homosexuality, Wash Post A12 (Apr 23, 1999).
'" See Cat Moses, Queering Class: Leslie Feinberg's Stone Butch Blues, 31 Stud Novel
74, 75 (1999) ("Transgendered subjects exist not in a space outside of gender, but in a
space in which gender does not necessarily follow naturally from 'sex,' in which biological
sex is often a mutable construct."); Mary Coombs, Sexual Dis-Orientation:Transgendered
People and Same-Sex Marriage, 8 UCLA Women's L J 219, 250-51 (1998) (describing
concurring opinion characterizing sex as biological but possibly mutable). See also Leslie
Espinoza and Angela P. Harris, Afterword: Embracing the Tar-Baby - Latcrit Theory and
the Sticky Mess of Race, 10 La Raza L J 499, 553 (1998) ("To the extent that white supremacy maintains itself by attacking the cultural practices that sustain blackness as an
ethnicity, African Americans and Latino/as have a shared interest in questioning the
bright line between mutable and immutable traits, biology and culture.").
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ine Franke argues that sex discrimination law fails due to the
acceptance of biological sexual difference as something real.48 She
asserts that sex-based biological differences are simply deeply
engrained gender prescriptions:
[S]exual equality jurisprudence has uncritically accepted
the validity of biological sexual differences. By accepting
these biological differences, equality jurisprudence reifies
as foundational fact that which is really an effect of normative gender ideology. This jurisprudential error not only
produces obvious absurdities at the margin of gendered
identity, but it also explains why sex discrimination laws
have been relatively ineffective in dismantling profound
sex segregation in the wage-labor market, in shattering
"glass ceilings" that obstruct women's entrance into the
upper echelons of corporate management, and in increasing women's
wages, which remain a fraction of those paid
4
men.

9

In other words, according to Franke, the disaggregation of sex
from gender permits continued discrimination based on the most
harmful gender stereotypes through the cultural fiction that gender is social while biological sex is natural."
Franke argues that two fundamental elements of sexual
equality jurisprudence must be reconceptualized.51 First, sexual
identity must be disassociated from physicality. 2 She contends
that "what it means to be a woman and what it means to be a
man ... must be understood not in deterministic, biological

terms, but according to a set of behavioral, performative norms
that at once enable and constrain a degree of human agency and
create the background conditions for a person to assert, I am a
woman."" Second, she argues that the concept of sex discrimina4
tion must be extended to categories beyond biological sex.
In reconceptualizing sexual equality jurisprudence, Franke
divides her investigation of sex discrimination law into several
parts. She begins by exploring the ways in which courts and legislatures have made steps toward formal equality while mainSee Franke, 144 U Pa L Rev at 5 (cited in note 28).
Id at 2.
5 Id at 98-99.
Id at3.
Franke, 144 U Pa L Rev at 3.
Id at 3-4.
Id at 4.
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taining a "belief in real differences between men and women
which the law should take into account."5 She argues that the
confusion has been compounded by overlapping uses of the term
"sex" that include biological sex, core gender identity, gender role,
and sexual behavior."
She continues by showing "the absurdity of disaggregating
sex from gender" through the example of sex discrimination
claims brought by transgendered people.57 She uses Ulane v Eastern Airlines58 and Underwood v Archer Management Services,
Inc59 to illustrate the absurdity of a definition of sex discrimination that means treating a man differently from a woman where
the meaning of man and woman is determined by assumptions of
biological fact.' "Under this formation, the goal of Title VII is a
biological
recognition followed by legal erasure of sexual differ1
ence."6

Both cases involved transgendered women who were initially
perceived or hired as men and were terminated when they underwent procedures to have their bodies match their core identities as women.6 2 In dismissing plaintiffs' claims, both courts asserted "sex" to mean biological sex.' Franke explains that the
cases illustrate the tensions among immutability, body, sex, and
gendered identity.' "According to the traditional view, the sexed
body -

one's inside

is immutable, whereas gender identity

-

-

one's outside - is mutable. Yet for the transgendered person, the
sexed body - one's outside - is regarded as mutable while one's
gendered

identity

-

one's

inside

-

is

experienced

as

immutable."65 Thus, Franke explains that the courts' treatment of
transgendered people exposes the biological determinism used in
interpreting the meaning of "sex.'66 At the same time, she explains that this biological differentiation, "biological dimorphism," 7 is rarely a motive in cases of sex discrimination.

Id at 6-7.
Franke, 144 U Pa L Rev at 7 (cited in note 28).
57

6,

66

Id.
742 F2d 1081 (7th Cir 1984).
857 F Supp 96 (D DC 1994).
See Franke, 144 U Pa L Rev at 31-35.
Id at 32.
Id.
Id.
Franke, 144 U Pa L Rev at 35.
Id.
Id.
Id at 36.

210

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1999:

Only in very rare cases are acts of sex discrimination based
on biology. Indeed, even employers hiring individuals for jobs in
which body strength is a reasonable qualification have abandoned
hiring policies based on biological sex because most studies of
male and female physical skills and abilities have revealed more
significant within-group differences than between-group differences.6" As a result, Franke concludes that biology and genitals
operate for the courts as "false proxies" for sex.69 The inconsistency is that sex discrimination law has defined "sex" to mean
biology or anatomy even though discrimination because of sex
generally occurs for reasons other than biology or anatomy.
Franke continues the exploration of this inconsistency in sex
identity cases, looking at cases in which courts have attempted to
police gender identity and at matrimonial cases in which a court
is called upon to determine the "'true sex'" of a partner in the
formation or dissolution of a marriage.7 ° Later in her article, she
argues that the disaggregation of sex from gender is wrong as a
historical matter, in that conceptions of opposite sexes and sex
immutability are relatively modern and that the inconsistencies
revealed by cases involving transgendered individuals are not
limited to that context but are also present in cases involving
parties considered to be more conventional or mainstream. 1 She
concludes that biological definitions of sexual identity and discrimination must be abandoned for more behavioral or performative conceptions of sex.7"
3. The Disaggregationof Sexual and "Non-Sexual" Harassment Impedes Workplace Equality.
Both Professor Franke and Professor Vicki Schultz argue
that courts fail to reach a wide array of discrimination because
sexual harassment involving sexual desire has been disaggregated from sexual harassment that is "non-sexual" - not motivated by desire.73 Franke argues that desire-based conceptions of
sexual harassment fail to support the jurisprudential equation of
sexual harassment and sex discrimination. Franke writes:

70
II

Franke, 144 U Pa L Rev at 36 (cited in note 28).
Id at 40.
Id at 40-70.
Id at 70-98.

Franke, 144 U Pa L Rev at 98-99.
7' See Franke, 49 Stan L Rev at 730-47 (cited in note 29). See generally Schultz, 107
Yale L J 1683 (cited in note 29). See also Estrich, 43 Stan L Rev at 820 (1991) (cited in
note 14) (discussing inclusion and exclusion of "sexual" element in sexual harassment
cases).
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Sexual harassment cannot and. should not be understood
as sex discrimination just because it may be an expression
of sexual desire. Rather, sexual conduct, whether or not
motivated by desire, becomes sex discrimination when it
operates as a means of enforcing gender norms. To the extent that desire plays a role in actionable sexual harassment, it does so secondarily.7 4
Schultz argues that the result of the disaggregation of sexual and
"non-sexual" harassment is that "non-sexual" harassment often
goes unpunished:
The courts' traditional failure to comprehend the magnitude of women's gender troubles at work, in fact, has only
been exacerbated by the prevailing paradigm's emphasis
on sexual forms of harassment. Singling out sexual advances as the essence of workplace harassment has allowed courts to feel enlightened about protecting women
from sexual violation, while at the same time relieving
judges from the responsibility to redress other, broader
gender-based problems in the workplace.7 5
Both Franke and Schultz seek to reconceptualize sexual harassment beyond a desire-based model. Schultz, for example, distinguishes sexual harassment that is desire-driven from that which
consists of gender-based attacks on women's competence.7" Yet,
men attack women's competence in the workplace in order to preserve male power in and out of the workplace. MacKinnon explains:
Sexuality is the social process that creates, organizes, expresses, and directs desire. Desire here is parallel to value
in marxist theory, not the same, though it occupies an
analogous theoretical location. It is taken for a natural essence or presocial impetus but is actually created by the
social relations, the hierarchical relations, in question.
This process creates the social beings we know as women
and men, as their relations create society. Sexuality to

76

Franke, 49 Stan L Rev at 734 (cited in note 29).
Schultz, 107 Yale L J at 1690 (cited in note 29).
See id at 1692-96 (discussing the sexual desire-dominance paradigm) and id at

1762-69 (discussing the competence-undermining function of sexual harassment).

212

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1999:

feminism is, like work to marxism, socially constructed
and at the same time constructing.77
Sexual harassment that is not explicitly sexual differs from sexual harassment that is explicitly sexual only in the degree to
which they are directly related to male power, to the "propping
up" " of the fantasy of normal male sexual behavior. Fantasies of
women's roles and women's competence are linked to men's fantasies of dominance and sexuality.
Schultz argues that "[miuch of what is harmful to women in
the workplace is difficult to construe as sexual in design."79 Yet,
she acknowledges that "non-sexual" harassment fosters the masculine role:
[M]any of the most prevalent forms of harassment are actions that are designed to maintain work - particularly
the more highly rewarded lines of work - as bastions of
masculine competence and authority. Every day, in workplaces all over the country, men uphold the image that
their jobs demand masculine mastery by acting to undermine their female colleagues' perceived (or sometime even
actual) competence to do the work. The forms of such harassment are wide-ranging. They include characterizing
the work as appropriate for men only; denigrating
women's performance or ability to master the job; providing patronizing forms of help in performing the job; withholding the training, information, or opportunity to learn
to do the job well; engaging in deliberate work sabotage;
providing sexist evaluations of women's performance or
denying them deserved promotions; isolating women from
the social networks that confer a sense of belonging; denying women the perks or privileges that are required for
success; assigning women sex-stereotyped service tasks
that lie outside their job descriptions (such as cleaning or
serving coffee); engaging in taunting, pranks, and other
forms of hazing designed to remind women that they are
different and out of place; and physically assaulting or
threatening to assault the women who dare to fight back. 0

78

MacKinnon, Desire and Power, in Feminism Unmodified at 49 (cited in note 1).
Cornell, 3 Animal L at 9 (cited in note 5).
Schultz, 107 Yale L J at 1689 (cited in note 29).
Id at 1687.
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These not explicitly sexual, but gendered, attacks on women's
competence described by Schultz are merely sublimated acts of
sexual dominance. Men attack women's competence in order to
"perform" (demonstrate their power) or out of "performance anxiety" (insecurity regarding their power as men). Men harass and
undermine women in certain jobs because they view women as
challenging male ability. Women in jobs traditionally held by
men disrupt the fantasy of male dominance and male uniqueness.
Ironically, Schultz's description of men's "non-sexual" motivation
is pregnant with connotations of male sexual potency and performance. She writes:
By maintaining a hold on highly rewarded employment,
men secure a host of advantages in and outside the workplace. Some of these advantages are material: Wage superiority over women, for example, ensures men's position at
the head of the household as well as their place at the
helm of most powerful institutions in society. Equally significant are powerful psychological factors: Both breadwinning and work competence are central to the dominant
cultural understanding of manhood. By protecting their
jobs from incursion by women, or by incorporating women
only on inferior terms, men sustain the impression that
their work requires uniquely masculine skills. Maintaining their jobs as repositoriesof masculine mastery, in turn,
assures
men a sense of identity (even superiority) as
1
8

men.

It is difficult to conceive that motivations to "ensure men's position," sustain the impression of "uniquely masculine skills," and
maintain "repositories of masculine mastery" are as "non-sexual"
as Schultz suggests. If a woman is equally competent in the male
position, performing masculine skills, what is left to the fantasy
of heterosexual male virility? Nevertheless, Schultz's central concern, that courts address some forms of harassment while ignoring sex-based attacks on women's competence, is a crucial contribution to the sexual harassment scholarship. s2
Id at 1690-91 (emphasis added).
Schultz's attack on radical feminists and the dominance paradigm, however, is
misdirected. Courts' unwillingness to acknowledge the relationship between male power
and male sexuality, between men's desire to perform and men's desire to perform, is a
failure of the courts as recipients of the message rather than the radical feminist messengers. By laying the blame for the disaggregation of explicitly sexual and non-explicitly
sexual harassment at the feet of the dominance paradigm, Schultz blames the courts'
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4. The Aggregation of Gender with Sex and Sexual Orientation Impedes Workplace Equality.
Franke argues that courts disaggregate sex and gender to
permit continued discrimination on the basis of presumed physical differences while curtailing gender-based discrimination. 3
Franke and Schultz both argue that courts' disaggregation of the
sexual from the "non-sexual" in sexual harassment cases is a
failure in the law of sex discrimination. Professor Mary Anne
Case argues that courts have imperfectly disaggregated gender
from sex and sexual orientation such that some gender discrimination, especially against the feminine and particularly when
manifested in men, persists despite prohibitions of sex discrimination. 4 Case argues that existing law should be reframed to recognize gender discrimination against the feminine. 5 She begins
her analysis by defining the relationship between sex, gender,
and sexual orientation and how sex and gender have been conflated.8" She examines the concept of gender, including the valuing of masculinity and devaluing of femininity. 7
The heart of Case's argument is her discussion of the manifestations of gender discrimination," focusing on discrimination
against individuals whose gender does not match what is deemed
appropriate for their biological sex. In particular, she examines
naked defense of hetero-patriarchy on the scholars who have tried to expose it. See
Schultz, 107 Yale L J at 1692-1701 (cited in note 29).
In defense of hetero-patriarchy, courts have disaggregated some sexual conduct
from other sexual conduct based on its resemblance to normal male behavior. The problem
is, as Franke and Schultz suggest, that courts treat harassment that is "non-sexual" differently than harassment that is explicitly sexual. See Franke, 49 Stan L Rev at 730-47
(cited in note 29); Schultz, 107 Yale L J at 1713-20 (cited in note 29). The problem is also
that courts treat harassment differently according to degree, and the degree is measured
by the standard of a fantasy of ordinary male heterosexual behavior. Male competence is
the foundation for the fantasy of men as dominant heterosexual sexual actors. By labeling
gendered, competence-based harassment as "non-sexual," Schultz facilitates the illusion
that the emperor is clothed. See Schultz, 107 Yale L J at 1755-74 (cited in note 29).
" See text accompanying notes 48-72.
Case, 105 Yale L J at 2-3 (cited in note 31).
Id at 4.
Id at 9-18.
Id at 18-36.
According to Case, the first generation of sex stereotyping recognized by the courts
focused on the assumption that an entire sex conformed to gender stereotypes. Case, 105
Yale L J at 37-38 (cited in note 31). Title VII unambiguously prohibits this type of discrimination. Id at 38-39. The second generation of sex stereotyping focused on assumptions that individual members of a particular sex conformed to gender stereotypes. Id at
39-40. The third generation of sex stereotyping recognized by the courts required an individual's gender to conform to stereotypical expectations for the individual's sex. Id at 4146. The fourth generation of stereotyping, which Case seeks to expose, stereotypes the job
and its requirements rather than the person holding or applying for it. See id at 37-38, 47.
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the example of effeminate men. 9 She argues that while courts
have recognized that forced sex/gender conformity is a violation of
Title VII in the case of masculine women, they have not given
equal treatment to cases involving effeminate men.9" Case attributes this inconsistency to the conflation of gender and sexual orientation - effeminate men are assumed to be homosexual.91 Case
notes that discrimination against the feminine is generally permitted even though discrimination against the masculine is generally prohibited.92
While Case advocates the passage of laws outlawing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, she does not argue
that Title VII currently prohibits discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation;9" rather, she argues that gender discrimination that is directed at men, and which is prohibited under Title
VII, is often mistaken as discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation and, as a result, disregarded.94
5. The Aggregation of Sex, Gender,and Sexual Orientation.
Professor Valdes' theory is similar to Case's in some respects.
Like Case, he discusses the conflation of sex, gender, and sexual
orientation and the privileging of the masculine.95 Rather than
focusing on gender, however, Valdes treats sex, gender, and sexual orientation as an inseparable triad.9" Taking sex, gender and
sexual orientation as endpoints of a triangle, the first leg is the
conflation of sex and gender.97 The second leg of the triangle is
the conflation of gender and sexual orientation,9" and the third
leg is the conflation of sex and sexual orientation.99 Valdes'
"[p]roject... reveals and concludes that each strain and every act
of discrimination always 'implicates' all three endpoints precisely

Id at 46-57.
Id at 49 ("It may therefore come as somewhat of a surprise to someone who pays
attention to the niceties of doctrinal legal analysis (although, not, of course, to a student of
cultural norms) to hear informed legal academics opine even after Hopkins that 'discrimination against male job applicants who appear "effeminate" is generally lawful, as is employment discrimination against cross-dressers.'), quoting Karl E. Mare, Power/Dressing:
Regulation of Employee Appearance, 26 New Eng L Rev 1395, 1420 (1992).
91 Case, 105 Yale L J at 57-58 (cited in note 31).
See id at 36-46.
Id at 57-58.
Id.

Valdes, 83 Cal L Rev at 25 (cited in note 30).
Id at 12-17.
Id at 12-14.
Id at 14-15.
Valdes, 83 Cal L Rev at 15-16 (cited in note 30).
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because the trio operates as a bundled, or conflated, set."100 According to Valdes, the conflation of sex, gender, and sexual orientation means that "there is no such thing as discrimination
'based' solely or exclusively on sexual orientation ... discrimination deemed based on sexual orientation also and necessarily is
based on sex or on gender (or on both)." °1 Valdes' method, then, is
to examine how sex, gender, and sexual orientation are
"(dis)aggregated" °2 and to show how the conflation furthers an
ideology of inequality.0 3
One of Valdes' many insights is that the random and strategic conflation of sex, gender, and sexual orientation by the courts
both circumvents equality principles and invigorates "tradition14
alist androcentric and heterocentric biases in law and society."

0

Valdes discusses how plaintiffs are viewed as conforming to or
deviating from conflationary norms and how these characterizations affect the legal outcome of cases." 5 In this regard, Valdes
explains:
Conflationary discrimination and decisions, therefore, not
only exploit heterosexism to facilitate the circumvention of
sex and gender equality principles, they also help affirmatively to invigorate both traditionalist androcentric and
heterocentric biases in law and society: on the whole, this
skew helps to legitimize and foster the elevation of masculinity over femininity as well as the elevation of heterosexuality over all other forms of sexuality. The conflation
thus invigorates hetero-patriarchy within legal culture in
much the same way(s) as it does throughout modern cul10 6
ture.

Valdes' theory of the conflationary triangle of sex, gender, and
sexual orientation diagrams an ideology of normal male heterosexuality in the law.

"0

"'

Id at 19.
Id at 16.

101 Id at 9.
,o' Valdes, 83 Cal L Rev at 9 (cited in note 30).
1
Id at 125.
1
See id at 122-25.
106 Id at 125.
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B. Sex as Fantasy
The theories of Franke, Schultz, Case, and Valdes are extremely significant contributions to the jurisprudence on sex
equality. Each has uncovered a facet of the inadequacy of sex discrimination law as it is currently applied by courts. Each has
suggested a framework for addressing existing conceptual problems in sex discrimination law. While they differ substantively,
these theories are ultimately the same at their foundation; they
all attempt to explain how the courts' manipulation of the meaning of sex, whether as biology, desire, gender, or sexuality, has
weakened sex discrimination law. All of the substantive concerns
that they identify, however, would be addressed by courts' application of a definition of sex as fantasy.
Moreover, a definition of sex as fantasy exposes the severe or
pervasive standard as a mechanism used by the courts to preserve a particular viewpoint." 7 Consider, for example, the Court's
statement in Oncale that "[w]e have always regarded [the severe
or pervasive standard] as crucial, and as sufficient to ensure that
courts and juries do not mistake ordinary socializing in the workplace - such as male-on-male horseplay or intersexual flirtation
for discriminatory 'conditions of employment.'"1 8 The Court's
use of the terms "ordinary" and "intersexual" is not superfluous.
The severe or pervasive standard preserves a particular viewpoint of sex - that which courts determine is "ordinary." The
preservation of this fantasy of sex is illustrated by the specification of "intersexual" flirtation. In other words, in the course of
prohibiting same-sex sexual harassment under the statute, the
Court revealed what it was preserving - ordinary heterosexuality.
Sex, including this view of sex, is fantasy.0 9 By "fantasy," I
mean the colloquial implications of the word and more. Fantasy,
as I mean it in defining sex, has at least seven characteristics: (1)
the fantasy of sex is created; (2) the fantasy of sex is illusory or
subjective; (3) the fantasy of sex involves desire; (4) the fantasy of
sex carries psychoanalytic implications; (5) the fantasy of sex is
1

See Rosenberger v Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 US 819,

828 (1995) ("In the realm of private speech or expression, government regulation may not
favor one speaker over another."). See also Patricia M. Worthy, Diversity and Minority
Stereotyping in the Television Media: The Unsettled First Amendment Issue, 18 Hastings
Commun & Enter L J 509, 517 (1996).
Oncale, 523 US at 81 (emphasis added).
"
Consider Anthony Paul Farley, The Black Body as Fetish Object, 76 Or L Rev 457,
466-67 (1997) (discussing race as fantasy).
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individualized; (6) the fantasy of sex is shared; and (7) the fantasy of sex has tangible effects. While sex is fantasy, the harm
that results from the imposition of sex is not.
The first characteristic defining the fantasy of sex is that it is
something that is created, like a daydream or a drawing. Everyone fantasizes. By fantasy, each of us creates for ourselves what
it means to be human in the world.11 ° We assume, when we speak
of an individual's identity, that the individual's identity is constituted, at least in part, by something called sex as manifested by
1 Sex is a verb
that individual."
as well as a noun.1 Saying that
sex is a verb as well as a noun means that in addition to being
something possessed1 by an individual and projected by him or
her to the world (noun), sex is also something done to an individual and something that an individual does to herself (verb). In
other words, beyond its colloquial meaning, to sex someone or to
"do" someone, in the literal sense, means making an assignment
or designating a sexual identity to someone. Sexual meaning is
split between each individual and the world between the dreams
and the visions of the dreamers. Although we strive to define ourselves as individuals, sex, in many respects, is a fantasy done to
4
US.

11

When a plaintiff brings a claim of sex discrimination, she is
naming what was done to her, unwillingly."5 She experienced
disparate treatment or harassment due to a supervisor's fantasy
of what she was, was not, or should have been - that she was too
See Ethel S. Person, By Force of Fantasy 1 (Penguin 1995).
. Compare this description of identity with MacKinnon's portrayal of sexuality:
1'

[Slexuality is to feminism what work is to marxism. I mean that both
sexuality and work focus on that which is most one's own, that which
most makes one the being the theory addresses, as that which is most
taken away by what the theory criticizes. In each theory you are made
who you are by that which is taken away from you by the social relations
the theory criticizes.
MacKinnon, Desire and Power, in Feminism Unmodified at 48 (cited in note 1).
"' See john a. powell, The 'Racing" of American Society: Race Functioning as a Verb
Before Signifying as a Noun, 15 Law & Ineq 99 (1997).
113
Compare Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 Harv L Rev 1709, 1715-45
(1993) (discussing property interests in race).
"' In a previous article, I explain that part of the fallacy in lower court protected class
doctrine is an assumption that the disparate treatment analysis requires membership in a
protected class. Title VII, however, does not assume or require any particular identification or classification. Rather, it prohibits that behavior, classification, or discrimination
based on some perception of an individual's race, color, sex, national origin or religion. e.
christi cunningham, The Rise of Identity Politics I: The Myth of the ProtectedClass in Title
VII DisparateTreatment Cases, 30 Conn L Rev 441, 469-79 (1998).
.. Id at 469-79 (distinguishing identity from the act of discrimination).
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aggressive, that she was not aggressive enough, that she was an
object of sexual desire, 1 ' that she was not a proper object of sexual desire, that s/he should have been either male or female but
was not."7
Second, as commonly viewed, fantasy means reverie, that
which is imaginary,"' illusory, or, at the very least, subjective." 9
The definition of sex as fantasy demystifies the centrality of illusions of maleness, masculinity, and hetero-patriarchy121 in sex
equality equations. That which is male, masculine, or heterosexual is not only dethroned from the seat of normality by the definition of sex as fantasy, it is disrobed of the veil of objectivity.
The third characteristic of the definition of sex as fantasy
centers on the substance of fantasy, which involves sexual desire
or that which enables sexual desire. 2 ' Sexual desire is obviously
fantasy. Sexual advances occur as the result of a fantasy of desire. One participant has an image of who he or she is, what he or
she desires, and that his or her sexual object is desirable or acceptable. In the paradigmatic case, a man fantasizes a woman as
the object of his sexual attention.' Sometimes the fantasy in"' See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of
Sex Discrimination 179 (Yale 1979) ("[A] sex stereotype is present in the male attitude,
expressed through sexual harassment, that women are sexual beings whose privacy and
integrity can be invaded at will, beings who exist for men's sexual stimulation or gratification.").
"17See generally Note, Shape-Shifters,Masqueraders,& Subversives: an Argument for
the Liberation of Transgendered Individuals, 8 Hastings Women's L J 195 (1997) (discussing treatment of transgendered individuals under the law); Comment, Reevaluating
Holloway: Title VII, Equal Protection, and the Evolution of a Transgendered Jurisprudence, 70 Temp L Rev 283 (1997). See also Coombs, 8 UCLA Women's L J 219 (cited in
note 47) (discussing omission of transgendered persons in same-sex marriage debate).
'1 But see Person, By Force of Fantasy at 34 (cited in note 110) ("Fantasizing is a
mental process that the fantasizer knows to be an act of the imagination. However pleasing the fantasy may be, the fantasizer knows that it is imaginary, a self-generated fiction.
In the process of generating fantasy and manipulating it, the fantasizer is almost always
aware of creating and directing the script and able to distinguish fantasy from reality just
as the child distinguishes make-believe play from reality.").
.. Webster's Dictionary defines fantasy as: "1. Hallucination. 2. Fancy, the free play
of creative imagination. 3. A creation of the imaginative faculty whether expressed or
merely conceived as a) a fanciful design or invention b) a chimerical or fantastic notion c)
fantasia d) imaginative fiction featuring esp. strange settings and grotesque characters."
Webster's Ninth New CollegiateDictionary 449 (Merriam-Webster 1986).
" See generally Francisco Valdes, UnpackingHetero-Patriarchy:Tracing the Conflation of Sex, Gender & Sexual Orientation to Its Origins, 8 Yale L J & Humanities 161
(1996); Franke, 49 Stan L Rev at 763 (cited in note 29) (discussing hetero-patriarchy).
1
See Person, By Force of Fantasy at 2 (cited in note 110).
122 Although the male harasser and the female object is the paradigmatic model, I by
no means intend to imply that the preservation of normal male heterosexual fantasy is
confined to such exchanges. The preservation of normal male heterosexual fantasy is also
effected through the courts' treatment of same-sex sexual harassment cases. See generally
Franke, 49 Stan L Rev at 733-62 (cited in note 29).
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volves a willing participant. Sometimes the fantasy involves an
object who is indifferent or unwilling. Who we desire is affected
by fantasies of beauty, health and propriety, images of who our
mothers and fathers were or were not, perceptions of power, and
a host of other illusions and delusions."' z "Sex" and sexual desire
include that which facilitates or is necessary for a particular sexual fantasy.124 This may include fantasies regarding the proper
role of men or women, fantasies about competence, fantasies
about power relations.
Fourth, by defining sex as fantasy, I mean to include the psychoanalytic implications of fantasy. In psychoanalytic terms, fantasy is the theater of the mind in which the fantasizer is the
author of the fantasy, a player (usually the star) in the drama,
and "the audience for whom the fantasy was devised."125 In By
Force of Fantasy, Ethel Person explains that fantasies originate
in childhood memories and experiences.12 She notes that Freud
asserted that fantasy was wish fulfillment directed at both the
127
frustrations in the external world as well as internal conflict.
As fantasy, individuals' views of desire, biological sex, gender,
and sexual orientation stem from formative experiences. An attraction to women in subordinate positions, for example, or a fear
or dislike of women in authority may have origins in childhood
experiences and unfulfilled wishes.
The fifth characteristic, that fantasies and sex are individualized, follows from the fourth. Perceptions and expectations of
manhood, masculinity and virility vary from person to person and
within an individual over time. Fantasies of sex are shaped by
individual contexts - experiences, education, and needs. Individuals project fantasies of their own sex and the sex of others to
the world in different ways.
The sixth characteristic of fantasy is that although fantasies
are individual creations, they are also shared.'28 Fantasies are

'2
See generally Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of
Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory and Political Discourse, 29 Conn L Rev 561 (1997) (discussing "multidimensionality" of sexual identity).
"28See Maria L. Ontiveros, Three Perspectives on Workplace Harassmentof Women of
Color, 28 Golden Gate U L Rev 817 (1993) (discussing the inseparability of race from sex
in the sexual harassment experiences of women of color); Comment, Title VII Hostile Work
Environment: A Different Perspective, 9 J Contemp Legal Issues 357, 372-85 (1998)
(same).
Person, By Force of Fantasy at 7 (cited in note 110).
2
Id at 10.
2
Id at 35.
2
Id at 122-49.
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shared through histories.12 9 Fantasies are shared through
culture.13° They are taught and policed. Romance, for example,
requires shared fantasy. Person writes:
We imbue all our significant relationships with fantasy,
and intimate relationships provide the ideal medium in
which shared fantasies can proliferate. Sharing fantasies
intensifies the emotional and psychological connections
between people. In fact, the deepest emotional ties generally occur between people who have congruent or complementary fantasies, whether explicitly shared or communicated through subliminal cues."'
While shared fantasies are important in good relationships,
shared fantasies also are imposed on unwilling subjects. Fantasies about women's impotence or incompetence, pornographic fantasies about women, and fantasies about male physical strength
or masculinity are all fantasies that are shared by some and imposed on others.
Finally, fantasy has concrete effects. Fantasy is not merely
playful or intangible:
There is a common assumption that fantasy has tended to
be excluded from the political rhetoric of the left because it
is not serious, not material, too flighty and hence not
worth bothering about.... Like blood, fantasy is thicker
than water, all too solid -

contra another of fantasy's

more familiar glosses as ungrounded supposition, lacking
in foundation, not solid enough.'32

'" See also Jacqueline Rose, States of Fantasy5 (Clarendon Press 1996) ("For one line
of thinking, the concepts of state and fantasy are more or less antagonists, back to back,
facing in opposite directions towards public and private worlds. But fantasy, even on its
own psychic terms, is never only inward-turning; it always contains a historical reference
in so far as it involves, alongside the attempt to arrest the present, a journey through the
past.").
13
Culture is only one way in which fantasies are shared. Of course, cultures are
mixed and varied. See Francisco Valdes, Latina/o Ethnicities, CriticalRace Theory, and
Post-Identity Politics in Postmodern Legal Culture: From Practicesto Possibilities,9 La
Raza L J 1, 8 (1996) ('[S]ameness/difference discourses are compelling to Latinas/os because the category "Latina/o" is itself a conglomeration of several peoples from varied
cultures and localities, all of which have managed to become thoroughly embedded in
American society through different yet similar experiences."). Part of the invidiousness of
the severe or pervasive standard is that it privileges a particular culture through the
fantasy of the normal (white) heterosexual male.
131 Person, Force of Fantasy at 123 (cited in note 110).
32 Rose, States of Fantasyat 5 (cited in note 129).
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Both individual and mutual fantasies have concrete effects. Mutual fantasies are helpful or rewarding to others. For example,
shared fantasies about masculinity may be imputed to a supervisor as competence. Fantasies of desire may be warmly received.
On the other hand, "[i]f fantasy can be grounds for license and
pleasure ... , it can just as well surface as fierce blockading pro-

tectiveness, walls up all around our inner and outer, psychic and
historical, selves." 3 ' Imposed fantasies stereotype, undermine,
harass or harm others in ways that are concrete and unlawful.
These characteristics of the fantasy of sex provide a conception of sex capable of addressing the concerns of Franke, Schultz,
Case and Valdes. By identifying the fantasy of sex as something
that is created, the objective assumption of biological sex that
Franke critiques is challenged. The value assigned to biological
traits is identified as something manufactured rather than something given. The characterization of the fantasy of sex as something that is created also reflects the sense of all four scholars
that sex is something manipulated by the courts.
By defining sex as something subjective or illusory, the second characteristic addresses at least part of Franke's concern
with objective assumptions. Courts should no longer assume biological difference as a given exception to sex equality. Biological
sex as a relevant difference is a socially constructed fantasy"
(subjective creation), just as gender is.
Defining sex as something subjective addresses the concern
of Franke and Schultz regarding the disaggregation of sexual and
"non-sexual" harassment. Assuming the possibility of sex-based
harassment that is not driven in some way by concerns of desire,
both desire and gender roles are subjective. Thus, the definition
of sex as a fantasy includes the non-explicit sexual discrimination
that has been disaggregated under sexual harassment law. The
definition of sex discrimination as the (unwelcome) imposition of
a fantasy of sex re-integrates non-explicit harassment with explicit harassment. The non-sexually explicit gender differences
and sex-based images of women's (and men's) roles and women's
(and men's) competence are actions based on illusion.
The imposition of these illusions, however, has concrete effects. The definition of sex as fantasy explains courts' invention of
a sexual/"non-sexual" distinction and segregation of evidence of
harassment that is explicitly based on desire from harassment

"

Id at 4.
See notes 129-32 and accompanying text (discussing "shared fantasy").
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that is not explicitly based on desire; the sexual/"non-sexual" distinction delineates relative proximity to the fantasy of normal
male heterosexual identity. Explicit sexual harassment may be
normal heterosexual male behavior, but it is sufficiently removed
from the fantasy of ordinary heterosexual male identity to be curtailed by law. Non-explicit sexual harassment is the power at the
heart of the fantasy of the objectively dominant role of heterosexual men. To curtail such harassment by law would challenge the
fantasy of objectivity and neutrality "propping up" male dominance.
The illusory aspect of the definition of sex as fantasy also addresses the elevation of the masculine over the feminine that
Case and Valdes identify. The existence of and distinctions between the feminine and masculine are fantasy, just as biological
distinctions and desire are fantasy. Substituting the words "valuable" and "less valuable" for the characteristics masculine and
feminine reveals the illusion. The illusion is not that certain individuals possess particular characteristics. Instead, the illusion is
that (1) the characteristics necessarily correspond to a particular
sex and can be grouped accordingly, or that (2) the characteristics
carry value according to the sex to which they correspond. A definition of sex as fantasy perpetuates the conflation of gender with
sex and sexual orientation, which Case critiques.135 Nevertheless,
it provides an avenue for addressing the bias against the feminine that Case and Valdes uncover. The application by the courts
of a definition of sex discrimination as the imposition of fantasy
would prohibit employers from discriminating against employees
because they failed to display the favored gender because a definition of sex as fantasy would incorporate gender fantasies,
whether masculine or feminine. Therefore, the imposition of such
fantasies could easily be identified as a statutory violation. Unlike Case, who concedes that employers should be permitted to
insist upon a particular gender in certain instances,136 a view of
sex as fantasy categorically denies the propriety of imposing gender perceptions. Because images of what is feminine and what is
masculine are illusory and transient, employers should be prohibited from discriminating on the basis of such fantasies, including femininity.
The characteristic that the fantasy of sex entails desire challenges Franke's and Schultz's idea that sex-based harassment
1

See generally Case, 105 Yale L J 1 (cited in note 31).
See id at 76.
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can be "non-sexual." Nonetheless, it addresses the problem of the
disaggregation of claims that Franke and Schultz identify because it asserts that both explicit and non-explicit acts of sexual
harassment are unavoidably linked to sexual desire and that
which facilitates it. Assertions of control over gender roles and
women's competence preserve an environment conducive to male
sexual dominance.
The sixth and seventh characteristics explain the harms of
the fantasy of sex as it manifests in sexual harassment law and
as it manifests in the aggregation and disaggregation described
by Franke, Schultz, Case, and Valdes. Once created, subjective
desire-based fantasies may be shared to create a harassing environment or to enforce gender roles. When these fantasies are imposed they produce concrete effects. Shared fantasies create real
effects from what is illusory, and on that basis, individuals' employment, including their emotional, physical and financial wellbeing, is affected.
The fantasy of sex is sometimes innocent, frequently pleasurable, and often important to us. We want our mothers to fulfill
a particular fantasy, and each of us has a particular fantasy regarding who our significant other should be. The concept of sex as
fantasy acknowledges the complexity of female, male and transgendered subjects and leaves room for wholist self-definition.'37
But when the fantasy adversely affects an individual's employment, then it violates Title VII.
My argument is that sex, as described by Franke, Schultz,
Case, and Valdes, is part of a fantasy of sex, and that, in individual cases, courts have allowed or disallowed the unwelcome imposition of the fantasy depending upon the proximity of the fantasy to the male heterosexual norm.' In this way, fantasy is an
instrument of the state.
In the introduction to her book, States of Fantasy, Jacqueline
Rose explains her central thesis - that "there is no way of understanding political identities and destinies without letting fantasy into the frame. More, that fantasy - far from being the antagonist of public, social, being, plays a central, constitutive role
"' See cunningham, 30 Conn L Rev at 496-501 (cited in note 114) (discussing wholism).
1
Fantasy preservation impedes the ability of men and transgendered persons, as
well as women, to challenge the enforcement of fantasy norming. See Franke, 49 Stan L
Rev at 696-97 (cited in note 29) (categorizing forms of same-sex harassment); see generally Case, 105 Yale L J 1 (cited in note 31) (discussing discrimination against effeminate
men).
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in the modern world of states and nations."'39 My argument
speaks to a particular use of fantasy by the courts. Put another
way, the courts, in balancing male enjoyment of the exercise of
sexual power14° with individuals' rights to be free from the exercise of that power, defend the right to be free from that exercise of
power only under conditions not essential to a shared fantasy of
ordinary male sexuality. The courts' protection of the right to be
free from the exercise of power because of sex is thus limited, and
that conditionality is as much a function of a fantasy of men's
pleasure as it is of women's liberty. As the relationship of the
sexual fantasy to ordinary heterosexual male pleasure increases,
the scale tips away from the individual's right to be free from the
imposition of the fantasy through Title VII protections. Thus sex
discrimination law is a function of the degree to which the fantasy imposed on a plaintiff is essential to the ordinary exercise of
power for the male heterosexual fantasy.
This description of sex discrimination law explains the problems identified by Franke, Schultz, Case, and Valdes that would
be addressed by a definition of sex as fantasy. Franke critiques
sexual harassment theories based on formal equality, desire, and
dominance for failing to address the ways in which sexual harassment "perpetuates, enforces, and polices a set of gender norms
that seek to feminize women and masculinize men.""4 She argues
that sexual harassment is a tool for ensuring gender
conformity."" By defining sex discrimination as the imposition of
(sex) fantasy, I suggest that courts should prohibit discrimination
that entails the enforcement of gender norms (which, according to
Franke, implicate biological norms and which, according to Valdes, implicate biology and sexuality). My contention is that sexual harassment law has failed to the extent that courts have determined that a certain degree of enforcement of normal male
" Rose, States of Fantasy at 4 (cited in note 129).
Dominance theory describes the power relationship between men and women.
Rather than theorizing equality in formal terms, treating women the same as men, dominance theory critiques the power imbalance. According to Catharine MacKinnon, "the
social relation between the sexes is organized so that men may dominate and women must
submit and this relation is sexual - in fact, is sex. Men in particular, if not men alone,
sexualize inequality, especially the inequality of the sexes." MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified at 3 (cited in note 1) (footnote omitted). Specifically, MacKinnon explains that
"[t]he question of equality, from the standpoint of what it is going to take to get it, is at
root a question of hierarchy, which - as power succeeds in constructing social perception
and social reality - derivatively becomes a categorical distinction, a difference." MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance, in Feminism Unmodified at 40 (cited in note 1).
.. Franke, 49 Stan L Rev at 696 (cited in note 29).
142 Id.
14
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heterosexual fantasy is acceptable and that the severe or pervasive standard is the exact doctrinal point at which that fantasy is
preserved.
Most courts interpret Title VII to prohibit the imposition of
fantasies of sex when the fantasies involve violence or forced intercourse or forced touching because violence or forced intercourse or forced touching is not perceived to be closely tied to the
fantasy of "normal" male heterosexual sexual pleasure.143 Where
such fantasies are more closely tied to the fantasy of "normal"
male heterosexuality, however, courts fail to recognize the discrimination claim as actionable under the statute.' 4 So, for example, Franke's theory of the failure of Title VII to reach discrimination based on supposed biological sexual difference because such differences are viewed by the courts as natural or inherent145 can also be explained by the degree or proximity of the
fantasy of sexual biological difference to the ordinary fantasy of
heterosexual male sexual pleasure. Because the fantasy of the
existence of two sexes with distinct and immutable physical
characteristics is closely tied to ordinary heterosexual male sexual pleasure, courts do not interpret Title VII to protect plaintiffs
from the imposition of the fantasy.

" See, for example, Bailey v Runyon, 167 F3d 466, 467 (8th Cir 1999) (reversing
summary judgment for employer where male co-worker grabbed male plaintiff's crotch
and asked for oral sex); Van Steenburgh v Rival Co, 171 F3d 1155, 1157-58 (8th Cir 1999)
(reversing summary judgment for the employer where male co-worker grabbed, put arms
around, and touched breast of female plaintiff); Panasewich v Dayton Hudson Corp, 1999
US Dist LEXIS 9186, *15 (D Or) (denying summary judgment for employer and finding
that physical intimidation by male employee, which included throwing boxes and pushing
carts at the plaintiff, did not involve occasional sexual horseplay and would constitute
severe and pervasive conduct). See also Moore v Sam's Club, 55 F Supp 2d 177, 183, 188 (S
D NY 1999) (denying employer's motion for summary judgment where a lesbian employee
was allegedly raped by her male co-worker).
I" See, for example, Penry v Federal Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 155 F3d 1257,
1260-62 (10th Cir 1998) (finding that plaintiff's environment was hostile due to genderneutral antics and thus not actionable, where male co-worker followed plaintiff to the
bathroom, compared a building to women's breasts and referred to assistants as "gals" and
not by name); Sandvik v Secretary, Dept of Health and Human Services, 1999 US Dist
LEXIS 8798, *15 (D Or) (finding that comments by male co-worker calling plaintiff a
"bitch", display of nude photographs to plaintiff and discussion of penile enlargements
were insufficient to create actionable hostile environment and were "sporadic abusive
language" and "isolated instances") (internal quotation marks omitted); Unrein v Payless
Shoesource, Inc, 51 F Supp 2d 1195, 1205 (D Kan 1999) (finding that male co-worker's
reference to women as "bitches", and request that plaintiff prepare food for him might be
gender-related, but were insufficient to demonstrate that all aggressive behavior toward
plaintiff was motivated by her gender); Yoho v Tecumseh Products Co, 43 F Supp 2d 1021,
1026-27 (E D Wis 1999) (finding sexual graffiti about plaintiff and her daughter to be in
poor taste and insensitive, but insufficient to constitute actionable harassment).
'
See notes 48-72 and accompanying text.
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Where physical or biological differences are less proximate to
the heterosexual male sexual standard, courts interpret Title VII
to protect plaintiffs from the imposition of the fantasy.14 Similarly, courts' acquiescence to sexual harassment that is not explicitly sexual could be explained as an attempt to prohibit sexual
harassment that is relatively distant from a fantasized norm
while preserving behavior that is more closely tied to the traditional male image even if the behavior is harassing.147 Consider,
for example, the Supreme Court's admonition that "the statute
does not reach genuine but innocuous differences in the ways
interact with members of the same sex
men and women routinely
148
sex."
opposite
the
of
and
Likewise, the bias of the courts against the feminine reflects
the courts' regulation of discrimination by degrees. Masculinity in
men and women is protected, while femininity in neither is protected, because valuing femininity is the greater challenge to the
traditional male norm. Femininity in men is a critique of traditional male sexual dominance, whether or not femininity is conflated with sexual orientation. The discrimination against effeminate men that Case discusses can thus be explained in terms
of degree and proximity to male heterosexual sexual dominance.
Prohibiting discrimination against masculine women in male jobs
challenges traditional norms; however, as Case points out, it does
not challenge the value that society places on masculinity.14 9 Prohibiting discrimination against feminine women in traditional
See UAW v Johnson Controls, 499 US 187, 206 (1991) (restricting differences be"'
tween female and male reproductivity as bases for discrimination). See also Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, Pub L No 95-555, 92 Stat 2076 (1978), codified at 42 USC § 2000e(k)
(1994) (codifying that discrimination based on distinctions between female and male reproductivity is impermissible).
1
See Deborah N. McFarland, Beyond Sex Discrimination:A Proposalfor Federal
Sexual HarassmentLegislation, 65 Fordham L Rev 493, 495 (1996) (arguing that men are
objects of sexual harassment because they do not fit stereotypes of masculinity).
Oncale, 523 US at 81.
See Case, 105 Yale L J at 32-33 (cited in note 31). MacKinnon also notes:
Women who wish to step out of women's traditional relations with men
and become abstract persons, to be exceptional to women's condition
rather than to receive the protections of it, are treated as if we are seek-

ing to be like men, without any realization that that concedes the gender
of the standard. Women who seek to meet this standard under sex dis-

crimination doctrine are served equality with a vengeance. To win sex
discrimination cases under the equality rubric, athletes, academic
women, professional women, blue-collar women, and military women, for
instance, have to meet the male standard: the standard that men are
trained and prepared for socially as men.
MacKinnon, On Exceptionality: Women as Women in Law, in Feminism Unmodified at 72
(cited in note 1).
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male roles, on the other hand, would attack the core of the fantasy of what is valuable.15 ° The ability of feminine men and
women to perform comparably in traditional masculine positions
challenges the sanctity of male virility. The bias against the
feminine that Case identifies, then, may also be explained as a
function of the proximity of imposed fantasies of sex to the image
of common male heterosexual sexuality.
The "proximity analysis," then, is a method used by the court
to protect a particular fantasy or viewpoint. Acts of sex discrimination are either prohibited or not depending upon the degree to
which they challenge the fantasy norm. Under the severe or pervasive standard, sexual harassment is either prohibited or condoned depending upon its proximity to the protected zone. Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's assurance that "[t]he
prohibition of harassment on the basis of sex requires neither
asexuality nor androgyny in the workplace."' The implication
here is that conduct involving some degree of unwelcomed sexual
harassment falls within the zone of normal behavior and to prohibit it would be to require asexuality or androgyny - something
that apparently is not normal (according to the Court).
Of course, everyone, at home.5 2 or at work, is free to have as
many and whatever sex-based fantasies she chooses, and reciprocal fantasies of sex, gender, sexuality, or desire are lovely. However, the imposition of fantasies (of sex, gender, sexuality and/or
desire) may not affect the hiring, firing, compensation, terms,
conditions or privileges of any individual in the workplace.
II. THE SEVERE OR PERVASIVE STANDARD IS CONTRARY TO
TITLE VII

How closely does complained-of behavior resemble the fantasy or image of normal male heterosexuality? If the challenged
behavior too closely resembles the image of normal heterosexual
male behavior, then courts will apply proximity analysis to preserve the fantasy and the discrimination. As the theories of
Franke, Case and Schultz demonstrate, courts applying Title VII
have defended biological sexual distinctions, masculinity (even
when asserted by women), and attacks on the competence of

" See Case, 105 Yale L J at 32-34 (cited in note 31).
...Oncale, 523 US at 81.
" But see Michelle Adams, Knowing Your Place: Theorizing Sexual Harassmentat
Home, 40 Ariz L Rev 17 (1998).
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women performing in traditionally masculine positions15 - all of
which doctrines support the fantasy of heterosexual male power.
When courts prohibit conduct under Title VII, they do so often
because the conduct is not something that "the boy next door"
might do. 54 But what if the boy next door acts in ways that impede women's equality? The problem with the Court's proximity
analysis"' and with the severe or pervasive standard is that they
exclude from the reach of Title VII "normal" conduct that propagates inequality.
The proximity analysis of the severe or pervasive standard is
analogous to the societal problems of the glass ceiling, acquaintance rape, and pay inequity. It is the plateau of sex equality.
While women have made significant progress into traditional
male and masculine territory, glass ceilings exist because some
core male and masculine havens are especially difficult for
women to shatter." Title VII has failed to break the glass ceiling
because the remaining degree of inequality is essential to the
maintenance of male power in the workplace, and, therefore,
women's inability to break the glass ceiling persists.'57 Women
fail to report acquaintance rape and the criminal justice system
often views it as consensual, because acquaintance rape is sometimes difficult to distinguish from normal heterosexual male behavior, and the harm done to women is a consequence of ordinary
human interaction.' Pay inequity persists because at some
point, as women's incomes approach men's, the inequity is viewed
as negligible.'59
Nothing in Title VII legitimates limiting individuals to a certain degree of equality and no more. That limitation, as mani6

14

See notes 48-94 and accompanying text.
For example, the Court noted in Oncale v Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc, that

the severe or pervasive standard is "crucial, and [I sufficient to ensure that courts and
juries do not mistake ordinary socializing in the workplace - such as male-on-male
horseplay or intersexual flirtation - for discriminatory 'conditions of employment.'" 523
US 75, 81 (1998).
See notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
See Ramona L. Paetzold and Rafael Gelu, Through the Looking Glass: Can Title
VII Help Women and Minorities Shatter the Glass Ceiling?, 31 Houston L Rev 1517, 1520
(1995) ("Title VII has been less successful at helping nontraditional workers move upward
to mid-level and upper level management positions.").
1
See id at 1519 (noting that the glass ceiling has been documented at an even
"lower level" than commonly thought; for example, only 6 percent of executive managerial
positions in Fortune 1000 companies are held by women).
""
See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 Yale L J 1087, 1165-67 (1986).
Comment, GenderInequality and Wage Differentials Between the Sexes: Is It Inevitable or Is There an Answer?, 50 Wash U J Urban & Contemp L 369, 395-96, 400 (1996)
(discussing comparable worth).
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fested in the severe or pervasive standard, is contrary to the
statute. The severe or pervasive standard is inconsistent with a
dynamic interpretation of the statute because it is contrary to the
1991 amendments to the statute. The severe or pervasive standard is also inconsistent with the original meaning of the statute
based on intentionalist, purposive, and textual analysis.
A. The Severe or Pervasive Framework
The assumption which underlies the severe or pervasive
framework is that some sexual harassment does not alter the
terms, conditions or privileges in the workplace. 6 ° The mantra of
Title VII sexual harassment jurisprudence is that harassment
must be severe or pervasive in order to be legally cognizable. 6 '
1. The Hostile Work Environment: Cases Priorto 1998.
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson'62 established a standard for sexual harassment cases that the Court derived from
national origin and racial harassment cases. 63 The plaintiff in
Meritor was a bank teller who, out of fear of losing her job, submitted to repeated demands from her supervisor for sexual favors.' The two had sexual intercourse forty to fifty times over
the course of four years. 6 ' In addition, her supervisor "fondled
her in front of other employees, followed her into the women's
restroom when she went there alone, exposed himself to her, and
even forcibly raped her on several occasions."'66 Adopting the existing EEOC Guidelines,' the Court concluded that sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment is an
" See Joseph M. Pellicciotti, Sexual Harassmentin the Workplace: A Considerationof
Post-VinsonApproaches Designed to Determine Whether Sexual Harassmentis Sufficiently
Severe or Pervasive, 5 DePaul Bus L J 215 (1993) (discussing methods used by courts to
determine whether sexual harassment is sufficiently severe or pervasive).
"6' Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson, 477 US 57, 66-67 (1986); Harris v Forklift
Systems, 510 US 17, 21 (1993); Oncale v Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc, 523 US 75, 81
(1998); Faragherv City of Boca Raton, 118 S Ct 2275, 2283-84 (1998); Burlington Industries v Ellerth, 118 S Ct 2257, 2264-65 (1998).
477 US 57 (1986).
163 See Rogers v EEOC, 454 F2d 234, 238 (5th Cir 1971) (stating that "mere utterance
of an ethnic or racial epithet" does not violate Title VII, which was aimed instead at
"working environments so heavily polluted with racism as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority group workers"); Cariddi v Kansas City
Chiefs Football Club, Inc, 568 F2d 87, 88 (8th Cir 1977) (holding that ethnic slurs directed
against plaintiff "did not rise to the level necessary to constitute a violation of Title VI").
'" 477 US at 60.
163

Id.

106 Id.
67 29 CFR

§

1604.11(a) (1998).
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unlawful employment practice."' The Court noted, however, that
"not all workplace conduct that may be described as 'harassment'
affects a 'term, condition, or privilege' of employment within the
meaning of Title VII. "T1 The Court established the severe or pervasive standard, concluding, as circuit courts had,' that "[flor
sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe
or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment
and create an abusive working environment.'" 7 '
In Meritor, the Court established that sexual harassment is
sex discrimination. The Court determined that "a plaintiff may
establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination
based on sex has created a hostile or abusive environment."172 It

is important to note that by the Court's own terms, sexual harassment does not become sex discrimination only when it is severe or pervasive. Sexual harassment is sex discrimination. By
proving that sexual harassment created a hostile environment,
the plaintiff proves that the discrimination altered the terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, thus constituting an unlawful employment practice.'73 Therefore, under the current
framework, the argument cannot be sustained that sexual harassment that is not severe or pervasive is not sex discrimination
- only that sexual harassment that is not severe or pervasive
does not alter the terms, conditions or privileges of employment.
Meritor, however, left the terms "hostile work environment"
and "severe or pervasive harassment" unclear. The Court later
attempted to clarify the severe or pervasive standard in Harrisv
Forklift Systems, Inc.174 In Harris, the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant's president often insulted her and made her the target
of unwanted sexual innuendoes: he called her a "dumb ass
woman," and told her, "You're a woman, what do you know" and
"We need a man as the rental manager."'75 The president also
suggested that the plaintiff negotiate her raise at a hotel and
'

16
170

477 US at 66-67.
Id at 67.
See Rogers, 454 F2d at 238 (applying precursor to severe or pervasive standard in

national origin discrimination context); Henson v Dundee, 682 F2d 897, 902 (11th Cir
1982).
171 Meritor, 477 US at 67 (citation omitted).
1
Id at 66.
173 Faragher,118 S Ct at 2284 ("We have made clear that conduct must be extreme to
amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment.").
174
510 US 17 (1993). But see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content
Neutrality, and the FirstAmendment Dog That Didn't Bark, 1994 Sup Ct Rev 1, 7 (1994)
(arguing that Harris failed to clarify sufficiently the severe or pervasive standard).
175 510 US at 19.
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asked Harris and other women to retrieve coins from his front
pocket and to pick up objects that he had intentionally dropped. 7 "
Harris quit when the president suggested, in front of other employees, that she had successfully arranged a deal by promising
to have sex with a customer.'77 The Court concluded that actionable harassment need not be so severe as to cause psychological
injury - so long as the environment is objectively hostile or abusive, and is perceived as such by the plaintiff.'78 The Court noted
that this test is not mathematically precise but depends on all the
relevant circumstances.'79 Critical factors include "the frequency
of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance;
and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work
performance."18° The Court thus reaffirmed the assumption that
some sexual harassment is not actionable. Conduct that is not
severe or pervasive is outside the scope of Title VII. 15 '
2. The 1998 Term: Sexual Harassment in the Absence of a
Tangible Job Consequence.
In all three of the Court's 1998 Title VII sexual harassment
opinions, Oncale v Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc,'82 and the
companion cases Burlington Industries, Inc v Ellerth... and
Faragherv City of Boca Raton,"s the Court reaffirmed the standard that sexual harassment must be "so severe or pervasive as
to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an
abusive working environment."'85
Oncale considered a sexual harassment claim under the hostile working environment framework of Meritor and Harris.
Plaintiff was a roustabout who worked as part of an oil platform
crew.' He alleged that he was subjected to repeated sex-related,
humiliating actions, including physical assault of a sexual nature
and the threat of rape. 7 The Court addressed the issue of
176 Id.
178

Id.
Id at 22.

"

Harris,510 US at 22-23.

177

o Id at 23.

...Id at 21.
...523 US 75 (1998).

118 S Ct 2257 (1998).
118 S Ct 2275 (1998).
8
Faragher,118 S Ct at 2283 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2264-65; Oncale, 523 US at 81.
" Oncale, 523 US at 77.
187 Id.
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"whether workplace harassment can violate Title VII's prohibition against 'discriminat[ion] ...because of ...

sex' when the

harasser and the harassed employee are of the same sex."188 The
Court held that same-sex sexual harassment violates the
statute,189 reasoning that Title VII would not be transformed into
"a general civility code" because sexual harassment must be severe or pervasive. 9 '
Ellerth involved a salesperson's claim that she was subjected
to constant sexual harassment by her supervisor's supervisor, a
mid-level manager, despite the company's policy against sexual
harassment. For approximately one year, plaintiff Ellerth suffered, but did not report, frequent boorish and offensive remarks,
comments about her breasts, threats that her life would be
harder if she did not loosen up or wear shorter skirts, and uninvited rubbing of her knee.' Burlington Industries appealed an en
banc reversal of summary judgment for the defendant. The Court
stated that the question at issue was whether, under Title VII,
"an employee who refuses the unwelcome and threatening advances of a supervisor, yet suffers no adverse, tangible job consequences, can recover against the employer without showing the
employer is negligent or otherwise at fault for the supervisor's
actions."'92 After discussing the relevance of the categories of quid
pro quo sexual harassment and hostile working environment
sexual harassment, the Court reaffirmed the requirement that
sexual harassment that is not tied to a tangible employment action be severe or pervasive.'93
The facts of Faragherare similar to Ellerth and the result is
the same with respect to the severe or pervasive standard. Plaintiff Faragher, during her five-year tenure as a lifeguard for the
City of Boca Raton, experienced continued harassment by her
supervisors despite the city's pro forma sexual harassment
policy."9 The supervisors repeatedly touched the bodies of female
employees without invitation, put their arms around the plaintiff
Id at 76 (citation omitted).
Id at 80.
Oncale, 523 US at 81.
...Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2262.
192 Id.
'9

19 Id at 2265 ("When a plaintiff proves that a tangible employment action resulted
from a refusal to submit to a supervisor's sexual demands, he or she establishes that the
employment decision itself constitutes a change in the terms and conditions of employment that is actionable under Title VII. For any sexual harassment preceding the employment decision to be actionable, however, the conduct must be severe or pervasive.").
"
The Court noted that neither the supervisors nor many of the lifeguards were
aware of the policy because it had not been disseminated. Faragher,118 S Ct at 2293.
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and other female lifeguards, touched the plaintiffs buttocks,
touched another woman's body in a manner simulating sex, made
crudely demeaning references to women, commented disparagingly on plaintiffs shape, and suggested during a job interview
that the applicant's willingness to have sex with male lifeguards
was relevant to her qualification for the position.'95 Although the
plaintiff did not file a formal complaint, she did discuss the matter informally with another supervisor.19 In deciding in plaintiffs
favor, the Court reaffirmed the requirement that conduct
must be
197
extreme to constitute actionable sexual harassment.
B. The Severe or Pervasive Framework Is Not a Dynamic
Interpretation and Is Contrary to the 1991 Civil Rights Act
The Court's interpretations of Title VII have been dynamic in
several respects. The Court's definition of sexual harassment as
sex discrimination, its application of Title VII to the hostile work
environment or in the absence of a tangible job consequence, and
its application of the doctrine to same-sex harassment clearly
demonstrate the Court's appreciation for statutory and societal
evolution. Nevertheless, in the context of the severe or pervasive
standard, the Court has not kept pace with the progression toward workplace equality.
1. Dynamic Statutory Interpretation.
In his influential text on statutory interpretation, William
Eskridge argues that statutes are dynamic and that statutory
meaning changes with time, interpreter, and context.' Dynamic
theory views statutory interpretation as a fluid process, involving
"policy choices and discretion by the interpreter over time as she
applies the statute to specific problems, and [responds] to the
current as well as the historical political culture." 199 Dynamic
statutory methods are fluid because statutes are fluid:
Changed circumstances have important consequences for
statutory interpretation. Statutes are enacted by their
drafters with certain consequences in mind, but whether
those consequences actually occur (or undesirable consequences do not occur) depends on a series of assumptions
5
19

Id at 2281.
Id.

197

Id at 2284.

19

See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statdtory Interpretation14 (Harvard 1994).

9

Id at 48.
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about people and institutions, about society and its mores,
and about law and policy. If those assumptions unravel
over time, the statute will not have its intended consequences, and however the statute is applied by decision
makers, it will be interpreted dynamically - that is, subsequent interpreters will apply the statute in ways unanticipated by the original drafters."'
Rather than having a fixed original meaning, statutory
meaning evolves, with time, as the statute is applied.01 "When
successive applications of the statute occur in contexts not anticipated by its authors, the statute's meaning evolves beyond original expectations."2 °2 Rather than discerning some objective statutory meaning, dynamic interpreters consider what the statute
ought to mean:
Practical experience in both Europe and the United States
... suggests that when statutory interpreters apply a
statute to specific situations, the interpreter asks not only
what the statute means abstractly, or even on the basis of
legislative history, but also what it ought to mean in terms
of the needs and goals of our present day society.0 3
Determining what a statute "ought to mean" according to societal
goals involves a process of evaluating political and social conditions, changing circumstances, and the practical realities of the
statute's application and effectiveness.
[A] statute is a political response to a problem or cluster of
problems, and the statutory drafters expect their product
to be applied in a manner that advances the overall political enterprise as well as its specific goal. Indeed, they realize that, in an important sense, statutory meaning is not
fixed until it is applied to concrete problems. Pragmatic
thought understands application as a process of practical
reasoning. Every time a statute is applied to a problem,
statutory meaning is created.20 '

Id at 52.
Id at 48-49.
Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretationat 49.
Id at 50, quoting Arthur Phelps, Factors Influencing Judges in Interpreting Statutes, 3 Vanderbilt L Rev 456, 469 (1950).
Id at 50.
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Dynamic interpretations reflect laws' synergism with the development of society.
Dynamic interpretation may be particularly relevant to sexual harassment law given that the prohibition of sexual harassment is an evolution in anti-discrimination law. The dynamism of
statutes is affected by issues that were suppressed or unresolved
during the legislative process and issues that were overlooked or
unanticipated.0 5 While the elimination of discrimination was an
issue confronted and resolved by the legislature, the recognition
of harassment as an unlawful practice was an outgrowth of the
application of sex discrimination law. 26 The argument can be
made that the interpretation of sexual harassment law should
evolve to reflect societal changes and the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of sexual harassment interpretations to accomplish current goals of workplace equality.
The workplace is undoubtedly radically different than it was
prior to the publication of Catharine MacKinnon's Sexual Harassment of Working Women" 7 in 1979, the 1986 Meritor decision,
or even the confirmation of Justice Thomas in 1991.208 Yet, thirtyfive years after the enactment of Title VII, the workplace remains
saturated with unlawful sex discrimination.2 9
Dynamic interpretations of Title VII should examine the accomplishments of the doctrinal framework as well as ways in
which it has fallen short of what the statute ought to
accomplish.210 Sexual harassment law has drastically increased
awareness of, and reduced women's exposure to, the most egregious forms of sexual assault and harassment in the workplace.211
Id at 51. Eskridge also discusses the effect of social and political resistance to the
dynamic nature of statutes. Id.
"
See Martha Sperry, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassmentand the Imposition of
Liability Without Notice: A ProgressiveApproach to Traditional GenderRoles and Power

Based Relationships, 24 New Eng L Rev 917, 921-31 (1990) (describing development of
sexual harassment law). See generally MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working
Women (cited in note 116).
MacKinnon, Sexual Harassmentof Working Women (cited in note 116).
See generally Chamallas, 4 UCLA Women's L J 37 (cited in note 32) (tracing the
history of sexual harassment law and literature).
' See Faragher,118 S Ct at 2288 ("It is by now well recognized that hostile environment sexual harassment by supervisors (and, for that matter, co-employees) is a persistent problem in the workplace.") (citation omitted).
0 Note, A Step Backward for Equality Principles: The "Reasonable Woman" Standard in Title VII Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment Claims, 27 Ga L Rev 503,
538-44 (1993) (discussing Title VII as "norm-altering" legislation).
"' See Deborah Zalesne, Sexual HarassmentLaw: Has It Gone Too Far,or Has the
Media?, 8 Temp Polit & Civ Rts L Rev 351, 354 (1999) ("What has changed is our awareness of the problems relating to sexual harassment, our willingness to put up with inap-
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It has not, however, altered the overall paradigm of sex inequality. Rather, it has been met with resistance by some that eliminating sex discrimination will mean altering "normal" behavior.
In other words, the current view is that prohibitions on sexual
harassment are fine as long as boys can still be boys.212
Consider, for example, the reasoning in Abernathy v Walgreen Co.21 3 Although the plaintiff's misconduct justified the

court's preliminary denial of injunctive reinstatement, the court's
description of plaintiff's complaint regarding the actions of his coworkers is illustrative of the boys will be boys attitude. Abernathy, a black man, held the position of Executive Assistant
Manager at Walgreen.214 While at work, Militello, a white male
co-worker, told a "crude 'joke'" to another male employee in Abernathy's presence.21 Because the "joke" concerned a matter about
which Abernathy was personally sensitive, he felt as if he had
been targeted.216 Walgreen responded by giving Militello a "'final
warning' that he would be fired if a similar incident occurred in
the future."217 Dissatisfied with this result, Abernathy sent a letter and the disciplinary report that he had written about Militello
to the equal employment officer at Walgreen and several civil
rights and civic leaders outside of the company.2 ' Abernathy was
fired because the disciplinary report was a Walgreen internal record, and he had distributed it to individuals outside of the company.219 Abernathy claimed that his discharge was retaliation for
his opposition to unlawful discrimination by Walgreen in failing
to discipline properly Militello for violating Walgreen's sexual
harassment policy due to racial bias.220 To establish a prima facie
case of retaliatory discrimination, Abernathy was required to

propriate behavior in the workplace, and companies' recent push to hold employees and
employers accountable for their actions in the workplace.").
212 See, for example, Oncale, 523 US at 81 ("[T]he statute does not reach genuine but
innocuous differences in the ways men and women routinely interact with members of the
same sex and of the opposite sex.").
21'
836 F Supp 817 (M D Fla 1992).
114 Id at 818.
215

Id.

Id. The court noted, however, that there was no evidence that Militello was aware
of plaintiffs sensitivity to the subject matter. Id.
211

217

Abernathy, 836 F Supp at 818.

218

Id. The list of external recipients included: (1) the president of the local NAACP,

(2) the president of the local Urban League, (3) a former DET enrollee in the city Department of Employment and Training, (4) a prominent civil rights advocate, (5) the Mayor of
Tampa, and (6) the pastor of a local black church.
2119

Id at 819.

IId.
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demonstrate "that he had a reasonable belief that the employer
was engaged in unlawful employment practices."22 '
The court rejected plaintiff's request for injunctive reinstatement because the court determined that the plaintiff had
failed to establish a substantial likelihood of success in showing
that he reasonably believed that Militello's joke was sexual harassment.222 Assuming that the court's denial of reinstatement was
proper, a question remains, nonetheless: why was Abernathy's
belief that Militello's conduct violated the company's sexual harassment policy unreasonable?
Among other things, the policy stated: "It is illegal and
against the policies of this Company for any employee, male or
female, to sexually harass another employee by: ... creating an

intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment by such
conduct." 3 The court concluded that "Abernathy could not have
had a good faith or reasonable belief that the 'joke' violated the
sexual harassment policy."224 Why could Abernathy not have a
good faith belief that Militello's conduct was sexual harassment?
The court's conclusion is remarkable in light of the fact that Walgreen disciplined Militello for his conduct.225
The answer appears to be related to the Abernathy court's
perception of what is normal. The court was impressed by the fact
that Militello's joke was told among men. According to the court,
"plaintiff complain[ed] about a single incident of one male employee ... telling a crude 'joke' to another male employee in the

presence of a third male employee, [the plaintiff]." 6 The court's
assessment of the reasonableness of plaintiff's belief seems to be
affected by a viewpoint that boys will be boys, that locker-room
behavior among men is normal: "Abernathy's belief that an isolated yet crude 'joke,' told among men only ....

fails to establish

a basis from which to conclude that his belief [that Militello's
conduct was sexual harassment] was reasonable."227 The court's
acquiescence to the view that boys will be boys, even in the context of sexual harassment, enforces the proposition that Title VII
and the workplace can only evolve so far so as to eliminate sexually harassing behavior.
" Abernathy, 836 F Supp at 821, quoting Payne v McLemore's Wholesale & Retail
Stores, 654 F2d 1138 (5th Cir 1981).
Id at 821.
Id at 819 n 2.
Id at 822.

Abernathy, 836 F Supp at 821.
21

Id.
Id.
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In addition to examining what the statute ought to accomplish, dynamic interpretation involves a "bottom up" approach to
statutory meaning.22 s The perspectives of private parties, agencies, and lower courts are considered, rather than only the Supreme Court's periodic proclamations.229 Despite Court efforts to
clarify the standard, the severe or pervasive standard from the
perspective of private parties and lower courts is arbitrary and
diverse. When is harassment pervasive? What harassment is severe? At what point do an employee's subjective feelings of harassment become objective? What notice does a harasser have that
he is about to cross the line? Divergent results for factually similar cases in the lower courts reveal that the severe or pervasive
standard is no standard in practice.' ° As a result, some defendants lack notice that their behavior is prohibited while others
are encouraged by the fact that their conduct is normal.
When the Court has failed to interpret Title VII dynamically,
Congress in some instances has brought the Court up to speed by
amending the statute.2 3 ' Notable examples of the dynamism of

Title VII in the form of subsequent congressional action include
the recognition of pregnancy discrimination as sex discrimination
and the elimination of the requirement of "but for" causation
where there is direct evidence of discrimination.2 2
a) Pregnancy discrimination
In General Electric Co v Gilbert, 3 female employees alleged
that the employer's disability plan, which denied benefits for
claims arising from pregnancy, discriminated on the basis of sex
in violation of Title VII.21 The Court, applying the rationale from
its Equal Protection decision in Geduldig v Aiello, 5 held that the
plan did not violate Title VII because discrimination on the basis
of pregnancy was not discrimination because of sex.2"6 Subse-

See Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretationat 69 (cited in note 198).
Id at 69-70.
See generally Comment, Toward a New Standard:Hope for Greater Uniformity in
the Treatment of Hostile Work Environment Claims, 78 Marq L Rev 190 (1994) (arguing
that treatment of hostile work environment claims by EEOC and lower courts has been ad

hoc).
" See Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretationat 49 (cited in note 198) (discussing threat of congressional override as dynamic force).
' See notes 233-38 and accompanying text.
429 US 125 (1976).
Id at 128-29.
417 US 484 (1974).
Gilbert, 429 US at 145-46.
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quently, Congress amended Title VII with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which provides:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include,
but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and
women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under
fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected
but similar in their ability or inability to work and nothing
in section 2000 e-2(h) of the title shall be interpreted to
permit otherwise."
Since Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the
Court has not wavered in construing discrimination against
pregnant women as sex discrimination.238
b) Mixed motive cases
The dynamic nature of Title VII is also evident in the interpretation of mixed motive cases.239 Price Waterhouse v Hopkins24
involved the claim of a senior manager that she was denied partnership on the basis of sex. Hopkins received excellent performance evaluations, but she was at times "overly aggressive, unduly
harsh, difficult to work with and impatient with staff."241 Nevertheless, some of the negative reaction to Hopkins stemmed from
the fact that she was a woman who exhibited allegedly masculine
traits.242 Partners at Price Waterhouse described Hopkins as "ma" Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub L No 95-555, 92 Stat 2076 (1978), codified at
42 USC § 2000e(k) (1994).
See UAW v Johnson Controls, 499 US 187, 198-99 (1991); CaliforniaFederal Savings and Loan Assoc v Guerra,479 US 272, 277 (1987); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co v EEOC, 462 US 669, 675-76 (1983). Testimony from the Senate floor debate
reveals that Congress passed the PDA to fill a "gaping hole in the protection which title
VII affords to working women" that was left by the Supreme Court's decision in Gilbert.
123 Cong Rec S 29385 (Sept 15, 1977) (statement of Sen Williams). The contortions that
the Supreme Court attempted in Gilbert in order to avoid the clear intent of Congress
were exposed by congressional declarations that the PDA was enacted to restore the
"commonsense' view" of the meaning of sex discrimination. Amending Title VII, Civil
Rights Act of 1964, S Rep No 95-331, 95th Cong, 1st Sess 3 (July 6, 1977).
'
Since the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Court has not addressed
the issue of causation in mixed motive cases directly. However, some lower courts have
applied the amendment. See, for example, Board v Children's Hospital of Los Angeles,
1996 US App LEXIS 25312, *8-10 (9th Cir) (unpublished disposition).
, 490 US 228 (1989).
" Id at 235 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
242 Id.
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cho," "overcompensat[ing] for being a woman," and in need of "a
course at charm school"; one advised her to "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear makeup, have her hair styled and wear jewelry."' 4 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari in order to determine the allocation of burdens
of proof in cases involving a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate
motives. 2'
The defendant argued that even if Hopkins proved that sex
played a part in the employment decision, she still had to prove
that defendant's employment decision would have been different
absent the discrimination.245 Plaintiff argued that proof that sex
played any part in the employment decision was sufficient for
liability and proof that the discrimination did not affect the ultimate outcome would be relevant at the remedial stage only.2" For
the Court, the "truth [lay] somewhere in between." 47 The Court
explained that it was attempting to preserve "the balance between employee rights and employer prerogatives." 24 As a result
of this balancing, the Court concluded that "the preservation of
[the employer's] freedom means that an employer shall not be
liable if it can prove that, even if it had not taken gender into account, it would have come to the same decision regarding a particular person." Congress soon made clear, however, that workplace equality is not subject to judicial compromise.250 Under the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, the plaintiff need only prove with direct
evidence that illegal discrimination was "a motivating factor for
any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice." 1

27

Id (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Price Waterhouse, 490 US at 232.
Id at 237-38.
Id at 238.
Id.

',

Price Waterhouse, 490 US at 239.
Id at 242.

'"

According to the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Act was
enacted to accomplish the goal of workplace equality as well as to correct the errors of the
Supreme Court. Upon introducing the legislation, Representative Jack Brooks stated that
the bill "was essential to give all women the same rights as those available to minorities,
to overcome the roadblocks in civil rights that were raised by the Supreme Court's decisions, and to continue moving forward toward the greater goal of equal opportunity for all
Americans." 137 Cong Rec E 229 (Jan 3, 1991) (statement of Rep Brooks introducing the
Civil Rights Act of 1991). The 1991 Act and the PDA reinforce, unequivocally, Congress's
transformative intent for the statute.
"' Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub L No 102-166, § 107(a), 105 Stat 1075, codified at 42
USC § 2000e-2(m) (1994).
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2. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 Invalidates the Severe or Pervasive Standard.
By maintaining the severe or pervasive standard in its 1998
decisions, the Supreme Court has ignored evidence from the 1991
Civil Rights Act of the continued transformative evolution of the
statute.252 The 1991 Civil Rights Act amended Title VII to correct
the Court's decision in Price Waterhouse.253 In Price Waterhouse,
the Court held that if a defendant were able to prove that unlawful discrimination was not the "but for" cause of an employment
practice, then the defendant would escape liability.254 Congress
amended Title VII so that where there is direct evidence that
unlawful discrimination was a motivating factor for an employment practice, even if not a but for cause, the statute is
violated.2"5 The 1991 Amendment provides, in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided in this title, an unlawful
employment practice is established when the complaining
party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment
practice, even though other factors also motivated the
practice.256
A change in the compensation, terms, conditions or privileges
of employment is an employment practice under Title VII. 257 If
that change occurs because of sex, including sexual harassment,
then the statute has been violated. Sexual harassment that is
severe or pervasive alters the terms or conditions of the workplace.258 In other words, severe or pervasive sexual harassment is
the "but for" cause of a change in the terms or conditions of the

2' See Franke, 49 Stan L Rev at 698-729 (cited in note 29) (discussing evolution of
the statute).
Price Waterhouse v Hopkins, 490 US 228 (1989).
Id at 258. See also Susan Bisom-Rapp, Of Motives and Maleness: A Critical View of
Mixed Motive Doctrine in Title VII Sex Discrimination Cases, 1995 Utah L Rev 1029,
1035-36.
"'
See Robert Brookins, Mixed-Motives, Title VII, and Removing Sexism from Employment: The Reality and the Rhetoric, 59 Albany L Rev 1, 69-70 (1995) (discussing 1991
amendment); Bisom-Rapp, 1995 Utah L Rev at 1060-65 (cited in note 254) (discussing
1991 amendment).
Pub L No 102-166, § 107(a), 105 Stat 1075, codified at 42 USC § 2000e-2(m) (1994).
42 USC § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson, 477 US 57, 66-67 (1986); Harris v Forklift Systems, 510 US 17, 21-22 (1993); Oncale v Sundowner Offshore Service, Inc, 523 US
75, 81 (1998); Faragherv City of Boca Raton, 118 S Ct 2275, 2283-84 (1998); Burlington
Industries v Ellerth, 118 S Ct 2257, 2264-65 (1998).
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workplace.259 However, because the Civil Rights Act of 1991
amended Title VII to eliminate the "but for" causation requirement,"' if a plaintiff proves that the terms or conditions of her
workplace have changed and she presents direct evidence that
sexual harassment, though not severe or pervasive, was a motivating factor in the change in terms or conditions, then her claim
of sexual harassment should prevail.
Plaintiffs who bring claims under Title VII allege some negative employment experience - failure to hire, termination, discipline, failure to promote, change in terms, conditions, privileges
or compensation. The cost of litigation, in terms of money and
time, would suggest that most plaintiffs have suffered adverse
circumstances in their employment that motivated them to bring
their claim." 1 Many plaintiffs are very unhappy in their jobs.262
Many quit or fail to progress.2" Therefore, the question in most
individual discrimination cases is not whether there was a negative employment practice or change in conditions; rather, the
question concerns the intent or cause of the negative employment
experience. In the context of sexual harassment, the question is
whether a cause or motivation for the change in terms, conditions
or privileges of employment is harassment because of sex, either
explicitly or not. While many sexual harassment cases involve
direct evidence of sexual harassment, some sexual harassment

Compare Franke, 49 Stan L Rev at 730-47 (cited in note 29) (arguing that "but for"
causation in sexual harassment doctrine is linked to particular equality theories).
See notes 239-56 and accompanying text.
l
Jane L. Dolkart, Hostile Environment Harassment:Equality, Objectivity, and the
Shaping of Legal Standards, 43 Emory L J 151, 239 (1994) (stating that litigation may
involve financial costs, create family tension, and leave plaintiffs "exhausted emotionally
and physically"); Barbara J. Gazeley, Venus, Mars, and the Law: On Mediation of Sexual
Harassment Cases, 33 Willamette L Rev 605, 607 (1992) (litigating sexual harassment
disputes demands "risks, cost, emotional trauma, and time" from both parties); Kimberly
Blanton and Diane E. Lewis, Case Studies in Sexual Harassment, Boston Globe 85 (Oct
13, 1991) (stating that plaintiffs often settle sexual harassment cases because the "emotional and financial costs of litigation are too high").
Franklin v King Lincoln-Mercury-Suzuki, 51 F Supp 2d 661, 667 (S D Md 1999)
(sexual harassment plaintiff suffered humiliation, embarrassment, depression, nausea,
compulsive behavior and nightmares following harassment); Anita Bernstein, Treating
Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 Harv L Rev 445, 461 (1997) (sexual harassment
plaintiffs often experience physical and psychological ailments).
See Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudenceof Sexual Harassment,83 Cornell L
Rev 1169, 1218 (1998) (noting that sexual harassment impedes victims in job performance
and may deprive them of professional camaraderie and mentoring); Dolkart, 43 Emory L J
at 187-88 (cited in note 261) (noting that 66 percent of sexual harassment victims quit or
were fired because of sexual harassment, and that those who remain in their jobs face
hardships such as exclusion and loss of confidence).
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cases inevitably involve circumstantial proof.2

If a plaintiff

proves that she was harassed, but is unable to prove with direct
evidence that the harassment (either explicit or not) was because
of sex (as opposed to personality, for example), then the plaintiff
has failed to prove sexual harassment.
Of course, not all workplace conflicts between men and
women are because of sex. For example, in Scott v Central School
Supply, Inc, 65 the district court rejected the jury's finding that
the plaintiff suffered sexual harassment and discriminatory discharge, because there was no evidence that sex was a factor in
any conduct affecting plaintiff.26 The court granted defendant's
motion for judgment as a matter of law because plaintiff's allegations were "sex neutral"'67 and because acts of personal animosity
do not, in and of themselves, constitute sexual harassment.s
Although the conduct in Scott was not explicitly sexual, it
may have been sex-based nonetheless. Starting from a definition
of sex as fantasy, the court would make that determination by
considering whether the conduct occurred because of an individual or shared illusion of plaintiffs identity, based on gender (including biology), desire (explicit or not) and/or sexuality.
In many cases, however, the issue is not whether the harassment was because of sex; often the nature of plaintiffs' evidence -

pornography, propositions, comments -

is explicitly

sexual. 2" The question of severity or pervasiveness, then, does
not refer to the existence of sexual harassment; rather it concerns
the extent to which the sexual harassment caused the change in

But see Brookins, 59 Albany L Rev at 75-81 (cited in note 255) (arguing that direct
evidence standard is problematic).
913 F Supp 522 (E D Ky 1996).
Id at 528-29. Plaintiff alleged that her supervisor (1) yelled at her and another
woman to get out of his office; (2) asked her to "humor" him while he moved a partition in
her office; (3) remarked that he had two store managers and only one (a male) understood
him; (4) remarked to a male manager that plaintiff could have any fluorescent posterboard
there was in the warehouse; (5) was late in getting out Christmas advertising for two
stores; and (6) responded that he was "grow[ing] weary" of plaintiff's petty complaints
when she complained that he was "holding up" her orders. Id at 524.
" Id at 529. Although plaintiff testified that her supervisor was generally insensitive,
abrupt and rude to his subordinates but not to his superiors, the court did not characterize
this behavior as sexual even though most of the subordinates were women and most of the
supervisors were men. See id at 524.
"'
913 F Supp at 529 (citations omitted).
But see Dornfeld v Omega Optical, Co, LP, 1998 US Dist LEXIS 1081, *9-10 (E D
La) (rejecting mixed motive framework in quid pro quo sexual harassment case because
there was no direct evidence that the employer, as opposed to female supervisor, sexually
harassed male plaintiff).
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terms or conditions. ° The severe or pervasive requirement is an
inquiry into whether the sexual harassment was the "but for"
cause of the change in terms or conditions or whether the change
was due to some other factor.
In granting summary judgment against plaintiff's hostile
work environment claim, the court in Gearhartv Sears, Roebuck
& Co, Inc,271 noted that "Hostile work environment sexual harassment is behavior that would not occur but for the sex of the
employee."272 In that case, plaintiff alleged that other employees
told jokes with a sexual connotation (including a joke regarding
women's undergarment liners), that a manager used non-sexual
profanity, that plaintiff received faxes with a sexual connotation,
and that female employees were referred to as "girls" and badgered because they lacked college degrees."'
After Meritor274 was decided in 1986, and prior to the 1991
Amendment, it was reasonable to inquire into whether or not the
harassment had caused a change in plaintiff's terms, conditions
or privileges. After the 1991 Amendment, however, such an inquiry is simply improper. Even if the sexual harassment, standing alone, did not change the employee's terms, conditions or
privileges of employment, a plaintiff should have a valid claim if
the sexual harassment contributed to the adverse conditions.
That the harassment was mild does not mean that the statute
has not been violated; it merely means that the sexual harassment was not the "but for" cause of the adverse change in the
terms, conditions or privileges of employment.
Schultz notes that sexual harassment proof is often split between disparate treatment and hostile work environment
claims.275 Evidence of harassment that does not explicitly involve
sexual desire is often analyzed under the disparate treatment
framework, while explicitly sexual evidence is analyzed under the
o See text accompanying notes 172-73 (explaining that severe or pervasive requirement is not a determination of whether or not sexual harassment is sex discrimination but
whether or not the sexual harassment altered the terms or conditions of employment).
"'
27 F Supp 2d 1263 (D Kan 1998).
272 Id at 1271 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id at 1269.
274 Meritor, 477 US 57 (1986); see also notes 160-71 and accompanying text.
See Schultz, 107 Yale L J at 1707-08 (cited in note 29) ("According to the court [in
"
King v Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System, 898 F2d 533 (7th Cir
1990)], the difference between disparate treatment and hostile work environment harassment is that whereas 'claims of disparate treatment must affect the term or conditions of
employment,' in a hostile work environment claim, 'a loss of a tangible job benefit is not
necessary since the harassment itself affects the terms or conditions of employment' (so
long as it is sufficiently severe or pervasive).") (footnotes omitted).
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hostile work environment framework. 276 Absent a tangible job
consequence, evidence of non-explicit sexual harassment is insufficient to prove a claim of disparate treatment, and isolated from
evidence of non-explicit harassment, explicit sexual harassment
evidence is insufficient to meet the "but for" causation standard
of severity and pervasiveness. 27 7 At least part of the problem that
Schultz identifies would be resolved if courts recognized a violation of the statute where the sexual harassment is mild, but
nonetheless contributes to the hostility in the work environment.
In other words, after the enactment of the 1991 Amendment,
given a work environment that is somehow hostile (constituting a
change in terms, conditions or privileges), sexual and sex-based
harassment need not cause the hostile work environment, but
simply must be a motivating factor in the hostile work environment.
One might argue that Congress's amendment of Title VII to
require only proof that the employment action was a motivating
factor, rather than proof that the employment action was a "but
for" cause, should be limited to disparate treatment cases because
that provision of the 1991 Amendment was a response to the
Court's decision in Price Waterhouse. However, nothing in the
1991 Amendment limits its application to disparate treatment
cases. The Amendment refers to "any" employment practice.27
Altering the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, like
failing to hire or terminating an employee, is an employment
practice.279 Because altering the terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment by harassment, like the failure to promote, for example, was an "employment practice" when the 1991 Amendment
...See id at 1714-15 ("Despite the origin of hostile work environment in the law of
disparate treatment, courts have developed analyses that distinguish the two causes of
action and endow each with a life of its own; to many courts, the two claims have become
'factually and legally distinct."). See also Franke, 49 Stan L Rev at 716-18 (cited in note
29) (noting that where sexual harassment is not explicitly motivated by desire, courts
often require proof that the conduct was based upon sex).
277 See Schultz, 107 Yale L J at 1718 (cited in note 29):
The problem with disaggregation should be obvious by now. It weakens
the plaintiff's case and distorts the law's understanding of the hostile
work environment by obscuring a full view of the culture and conditions
of the workplace. Both the hostile work environment and the disparate
treatment claims are trivialized. When removed from the larger discriminatory context, the sexual conduct can appear insignificant. For this rea-

son, courts often conclude that the harassment was not sufficiently severe
or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create a hostile or
abusive work environment.
278
27

See notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
42 USC § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
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was enacted, the Amendment thus requires only that sex be a
motivating factor in altering the work conditions in sexual harassment cases, just as it requires only that a prohibited form of
discrimination be a motivating factor in cases involving the failure to promote. To require that sexual harassment be severe or
pervasive is to require, contrary to the 1991 Amendment, that the
sexual harassment alone "alter"280 the conditions of employment
(be a "but for" cause) rather than require that sexual harassment
be a motivating factor in the alteration of the conditions of employment. Thus, Congress's enactment of the 1991 Amendment
supersedes the severe or pervasive requirement.
In Llampallas v Mini-Circuits Lab, Inc,"' a case involving
events occurring prior to November 1991,28 a Florida district
court applied the Price Waterhouse analysis to a quid pro quo
sexual harassment claim. The plaintiff and her lover both worked
for defendant Mini-Circuits. The court found direct evidence of
sexual harassment because during their relationship, plaintiffs
lover, who was the general manager for the defendant, told plaintiff that she would cause plaintiff to be fired if their relationship
ever ended. When their relationship eventually ended, the plaintiffs former lover told the defendant's president that she could
not work with plaintiff. The defendant then terminated the plaintiff. The court found direct evidence of sexual harassment.2 3 Because the defendant argued that the plaintiffs termination was
due to a legitimate motive, plaintiffs poor work performance,'
the court applied the Price Waterhouse analysis to the plaintiffs
complaint. The court reasoned, "Once the plaintiff has come forth
with direct evidence of sexual harassment violative of Title VII,
to avoid liability, the defendant must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that it would have made the same decision irrespective of the harassment."285 The defendant failed to meet this burden, and the plaintiff prevailed.

Oncale, 523 US at 81 ("[Title VII] forbids only behavior so objectively offensive as
to alter the 'conditions' of the victim's employment."). Requiring that sexual harassment
alter work conditions is a 'but for" condition contrary to the statute.
1
1995 US Dist LEXIS 21199 (S D Fla).
"'
November 21, 1991 is the effective date of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Pub L No
102-166, 105 Stat 1100 (1991).
Compare Dornfeld, 1998 US Dist LEXIS 1081, *9-10 (declining to apply Price
Waterhouse analysis in case involving quid pro quo sexual harassment where harassing
incident constituted circumstantial rather than direct evidence of discriminatory termination).
28 Llampallas, 1995 US Dist LEXIS 21199 at *16-20.
Id at* 17-18.
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In Stacks v Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc,' the district court's application of Price Waterhouse to a pre-1991 hostile
work environment claim was reversed. Plaintiff Stacks alleged
that she had been harassed and discharged because of her sex.287
She presented direct evidence of both sexually explicit harassment and harassment that was not explicitly sexual in nature.2 "'
Stacks alleged that business parties were held in hotel rooms to
which male representatives brought "dates," whom they referred
to as "road whores" and "berated, talked down to, made fun of,
and passed around."289 At one party, a videotape was shown in
which two female sales representatives in a car exposed themselves to male representatives.29 ° The demeaning nature of the
parties affected Stacks and made her uncomfortable with coworkers.291 The plaintiff also presented evidence of sexually offensive comments, "jokes" about masturbation, references to "tits
and ass," and comments about sales representatives' breasts.292
Additionally, Stacks alleged that Hudson, plaintiff's immediate supervisor, treated her differently than he treated white
males.2 93 She testified that he "humiliated, degraded, and raked
her over the coals" in front of co-workers.294 She alleged that despite her excellent sales results, he treated less successful males
better, and that Hudson's abusive behavior made her feel
"worthless" and that she could do nothing right.295 Hudson admitted stating, "[W]omen in sales were the worst thing that had
happened to this company."296 Other employees testified that
Hudson had also stated, "IT]he business had gone downhill since
the company had started hiring women and blacks" and "[T]here
isn't a woman alive that can make it with [this company]." 2 97
Plaintiff was also subjected to an unusual grievance procedure.2 8
Defendant, however, presented lawful motives for plaintiff's
treatment and termination. Although the plaintiff was a top sales

2N
17

27 F3d 1316 (8th Cir 1994).

Id at 1318.

Id at 1318-21.
Id at 1320.
Stacks, 27 F3d at 1320.
2' Id.
Id at 1321.
"
Id at 1319.
Stacks, 27 F3d at 1319.
2" Id.
Id at 1318.
2" Id.
Stacks, 27 F3d at 1318.
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representative,29 9 she was terminated when her supervisor allegedly became concerned that she had "lost control" of her job, disregarded Hudson's instructions, and lied about her whereabouts
on the job.3 °0 After an incident in which the plaintiff burst into
tears when corrected, the plaintiff told Hudson that the job was
"too much stress and strain" and wrote him a note stating that
she "quit.""' Hudson tore up the note and persuaded her to stay.
When Stacks' performance allegedly continued to lag, the defen3 2
dant suspended her for five days and then terminated her.
Plaintiff testified that she "quit" in order to stop the harassment
and that no male employee had been suspended for the performance problems attributed to her.30 3
Both the district court and the court of appeals treated the
plaintiff's termination claim separately from her hostile work environment sexual harassment claim.3 4 After the trial court found
no discrimination, Stacks appealed. The court of appeals remanded because the district court had failed to apply the Price
2' Idat 1321.
o Id at 1319.
Id at 1318-19.
Stacks, 27 F3d at 1319.
Id at 1319-20. Defendant alleged that plaintiff failed to return phone calls. Id at

301

1320.
See generally Schultz, 107 Yale L J 1683 (cited in note 29) (questioning the separate treatment of sexual and sex-based harassment claims). The district court in Chapin v
FDIC, 1994 US Dist LEXIS 605 (N D Ill) rejected plaintiffs claim of sexual harassment
based on sex stereotyping. Id at *3-5. Defendants argued that plaintiffs claim should be
dismissed because "sex stereotyping ...cannot constitute sexual harassment." Id at *3.
The district court agreed, concluding "[t]he Supreme Court held in Price Waterhouse v
Hopkins that reliance by an employer on sexual stereotypes when making employment
decisions constitutes sex discrimination in violation of Title VII, not sexual harassment."
Id at *4 (citation omitted).
Not only is the court's failure to apply Price Waterhouse in the sexual harassment
context an example of the disaggregation of sex-based harassment from sexual harassment, it exemplifies the misconception of causation in sexual harassment cases when
there is no tangible job consequence beyond plaintiffs discomfort and lack of success. But
see Doe v City of Belleville, 119 F3d 563, 580-81 (7th Cir 1997) (applying Price Waterhouse
"but for" analysis to determine viability of same-sex sexual harassment claim); Rasmusson
v CopelandLumber Yards, Inc, 988 F Supp 1294, 1300 (D Nev 1997) (same). The court in
Chapin held that "In order to successfully state a claim for hostile environment sexual
harassment, plaintiff must allege facts that show that defendants' sexual harassment, as
defined by the Seventh Circuit, caused a hostile work environment." Chapin, 1994 US Dist
LEXIS 605 at *3.
The imposition of the hostile work environment requirement on sexual harassment
, laims where there is no tangible job consequence is the imposition of a but-for causation
requirement. In other words, the hostile work environment is proof that but for the sexual
harassment, the plaintiff would have prospered in the workplace. The 1991 Amendment
removed the but-for causation element. See text accompanying notes 275-80. It is enough
that the harassment be mild or sporadic and the environment unpleasant. If plaintiff
proves that a fantasy of relevant difference was a factor affecting her employment, then
plaintiff has proven sexual harassment according to the motivating factor standard.
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Waterhouse analysis. On remand, the district court applied pre1991 Amendment Price Waterhouse analysis to both the termination and sexual harassment claims, and found no violation of the
statute.0 5
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's
decision regarding the plaintiff's termination claim, and found
that Hudson had participated in the employment decision and
that his comment that "women were the worst thing" indicated
discriminatory animus even though Hudson characterized the
comment as a joke."0 6 Additionally, the court found "ample circumstantial evidence "3 °' as well as undisputed direct evidence
that Stacks was treated differently from her male counterparts in
the disciplinary actions leading to her termination.0 8 Moreover,
the court determined that the division sales manager had "set
[plaintiff] up to fail by notifying her of the suspension five days
before the end of [a major sales event] and then refusing to offer
her any assistance in completing her assignments."3 s Having determined that Stacks was discriminatorily discharged, the court
concluded, based on evidence supporting plaintiff's discharge as
well as evidence of incidents of a sexual nature, ' that the defendant maintained a hostile work environment.31 '
In reaching its conclusion, however, the court rejected the
application of a Price Waterhouse analysis in hostile work environment cases. According to the court,
[t]he mixed-motives analysis is inapplicable to a hostilework-environment claim. The analysis was designed for a
challenge to "an adverse employment decision in which
both legitimate and illegitimate considerations played a
part." An employer could never have a legitimate reason
for creating a hostile-work-environment. "Rather, the key
issue" in analyzing a hostile-work-environment claim "is
whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvanta-

Stacks, 27 F3d at 1323.
Id at 1323-26.
'

Id at 1325.
Id at 1325-26.

Stacks, 27 F3d at 1325-26.
In its initial decision, the district court had concluded that plaintiffs sexual harassment claim was barred because Stacks had not detailed incidents of a sexual nature
before the EEOC. Id at 1326 n 4. See generally Schultz, 107 Yale L J 1683 (cited in note
29) (discussing disaggregation of sexual claims from non-sexual claims in the sexual harassment context).
30

3.

Stacks, 27 F3d at 1326-27.

1991

"SEVERE OR PERVASIVE" AS MALE FANTASY

251

geous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed."312
The court's conclusion is inconsistent with the theory of mixedmotive cases.313 An employer could have many legitimate (that is,
lawful) reasons for creating a hostile work environment.3"4 The
employer may not like smokers or people who are slightly overweight or morning people. The employer may be having personal
problems or be overworked. Any of these factors and a host of
others may lawfully motivate an employer to create a hostile
work environment. The creation of the hostile work environment
may not, however, be motivated by any fantasy of sex.
In Stacks, where the harassment was both severe and pervasive, the court's failure to apply a Price Waterhouse analysis was
of no consequence. But where the sexual harassment is not severe
or pervasive, the failure to apply the motivating factor analysis
could alter the result of the litigation. Applying the motivating
factor test, plaintiffs who, because of sexual harassment, might
have felt marginalized, languished, lost interest or confidence in
their work, or experienced discomfort in the workplace, would
have cognizable claims if the conduct was motivated by sex, even
if the conduct was neither severe nor .pervasive.
Roark v Kidder, Peabody & Co3"' illustrates the point. The
plaintiff, Candice Roark, was a securities sales assistant who alleged that her work environment was hostile. In addition to specific acts of sexual harassment, plaintiff alleged that on four occasions, the branch manager, McLochlin, failed to sign trade correction documents that she had submitted for authorization, that
McLochlin reprimanded plaintiff for errors that co-workers commonly made without being subject to reprimand, and that McLochlin "walked toward her while she was speaking to co-workers
[and] addressed the co-workers by name and ignored [her]."3' In

addition, Roark alleged that when she complained about McLochlin's conduct to the Human Resources department, McLochlin
312

Id at 1326 (citations omitted).

But see Bisom-Rapp, 1995 Utah L Rev at 1047-48 (cited in note 254) (discussing
difficulty of untangling legitimate and illegitimate motives).
"' Compare EEOC v FarmerBrothers Co, 31 F3d 891, 898 (9th Cir 1994) (suggesting
that harassers may have a "mixed motive" as between sexual desire and hatred of
women), with Franke, 49 Stan L Rev at 719-20 (cited in note 29) (accepting that the
court's reasoning in Stacks "may be true," but asserting bisexual harassment as illegitimate, yet nondiscriminatory).
"' 959 F Supp 379 (N D Tex 1997).
1,6 Id at 381.
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called her into a meeting with her immediate supervisor and
"yelled and screamed at her and called her selfish." 17 Roark testified that she was frightened and upset, began crying, felt nauseated, and feared that her heart, which was regulated by a pacemaker, would fail.31 While still crying, Roark ran from McLochlin's office down 39 flights of stairs and again telephoned a
Human Resources representative. She then fainted and was
taken by ambulance to the hospital, where she was treated and
released.319 The employment situation deteriorated and plaintiff
ultimately was asked to resign.'
Setting aside specific instances of sexual harassment, there
was evidence that plaintiff's workplace was hostile. The next
question, then, should be whether there was direct evidence that
sex was a motivating factor, even if not a "but for" cause, in the
hostility of plaintiffs workplace. Roark based her hostile work
environment claim on four events: two "non-sexual" hugs, a comment by McLochlin to a temporary worker that "Gloria and Candi
(Plaintiff) are great people if you can keep them sober," and a
comment regarding plaintiffs attire.2 ' It is arguable that the two
hugs were not only "non-sexual"322 but also not sex-based 32 3 and
that the comment regarding Roark's sobriety was also not sexbased. In regard to plaintiffs attire, however, McLochlin said,
"Those boots have 1-900 numbers written all over them. Now I
know how you really make your money with your brokers." 24
Roark testified that the comment was made in the presence of coworkers and a client and that she felt "severely humiliated and
embarrassed."325 This comment regarding her attire was direct
evidence that sex was a motivating factor in the hostility of the
work environment.
The court, however, concluded that plaintiff had failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact with regard to her claim
317

Id.

"' Id at 381-82.
3" Roark, 959 F Supp at 382.
Id.
Id at 380-81.
See text accompanying notes 71-78 (challenging the non-sexual/sexual distinction).
Roark described the hugs as "non-sexual" and said that she was not offended when
they occurred. Roark, 959 F Supp at 380. However, she testified that the hugs contributed
to the hostility of the work environment in retrospect when another co-worker told her
that McLochlin gave her several "unwanted hugs" that "put [the co-worker] in fear and
made her cry." Id at 384. During deposition, however, the co-worker denied ever telling
'"

Roark that the hugs that she received were inappropriate. Id. The court resolved the conflict in testimony in Roark's favor for purposes of summary judgment. Id.

Id at 380-81.
Id at 381.
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3 26
of sexual harassment based on a hostile work environment. According to the court, "Two hugs and two jokes do not constitute
conduct of the level necessary to maintain a claim for sexual harassment."3 27 The court reasoned that the "conduct was by no
means frequent, severe or threatening, nor did it unreasonably
interfere with Plaintiffs work performance." 32 ' The court's conclusion is particularly illustrative because the court explicitly
stated that it considered both sexual and "non-sexual" evidence in
determining that Roark had failed to establish a hostile work environment." According to the court, "Conduct does not need to be
sexual in nature to constitute sexual harassment. It only needs to
be unlawfully based on gender.... Assuming that the entirety of
McLochlin's actions are included in Plaintiff's claim, Plaintiff still
fails to meet her evidentiary burden."3 3
The court determined that most of the conduct plaintiff complained of was not sex-based. 33' However, without the severe or
pervasive standard, plaintiffs case could have at least survived
summary judgment because plaintiffs allegations would have
presented an issue of material fact that sex was a motivating factor in the hostility of the workplace, applying the 1991 Amendment. If the court finds that the alleged sexual harassment was
mild and sporadic, plaintiff would be limited to declaratory and
injunctive relief as provided by the statute.

C. The Severe or Pervasive Standard is Contrary to Title VII's
Original Meaning
The basic textbook rule for statutory construction is that
courts must construe statutes according to the intent of the legislature:
In the interpretation of statutes, the legislative will is the
all-important or controlling factor. Indeed, it is frequently
stated in effect that the intention of the legislature constitutes the law. Accordingly, the primary rule of construction of statutes is to ascertain and declare the intention of
'" Id at 385. The court, however, found that plaintiff's retaliation claim was sufficient
to survive defendant's motion for summary judgment. Id at 387.
Roark, 959 F Supp at 384.
' Id. The court also considered the fact that the hugs and comments stopped after
Roark told McLochlin that she was offended. Id at 384-85.
Id at 385. See text accompanying notes 73-82 (addressing the significance of the
non-sexual/sexual distinction).
Id (citations omitted).
" Roark, 959 F Supp at 385.
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the legislature, and to carry such intention into effect to
the fullest degree. A construction adopted should not be
such as to nullify, destroy, or defeat the intention of the
legislature.332
The intentionalist view conceptualizes a collective congressional
mindset and looks to that congressional intent for statutory
meaning and authority. Intentionalist method333 is based on a
respect for the constitutional role of the legislature as
lawmaker.3"
With the resurgence in discourse concerning interpretive
methodology,3 5 however, scholars have noted the degrees to
which Supreme Court interpretations diverge from the pursuit of
legislative intent. William Eskridge identifies intentionalism as
Michael Lepp, Statutes, 73 Am Jur 2d Statutes § 145 (1974) (citations omitted).
In Oregon, the courts are directed by statute to conform their construction of statutes to legislative intent. Or Rev Stat § 174.020 (1995) ("In the construction of a statute
the intention of the legislature is to be pursued if possible."). In PortlandGeneral Electric
Co v Bureau of Labor & Industries, 859 P2d 1143, 1145-47 (1993), the Oregon Supreme
Court held that "the intention of the legislature" could be discerned by first examining the
text of the statute in its context and then, if necessary, the legislative history and other
interpretive aids. See also Carl E. Brody, Jr., A Historical Review of Affirmative Action
and the Interpretationof Its Legislative Intent by the Supreme Court, 29 Akron L Rev 291,
313-21 (1996) (discussing legislative intent of constitutional and statutory provisions
regarding affirmative action). But see Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure
in Statutory Interpretation,17 Harv J L & Pub Pol 61, 65-66 (1994) (arguing that subjective intent is irrelevant in construing the intention of the legislature).
In The Interpretationand Application of Statutes (Little, Brown 1975), Dickerson
notes:
'

[T]he legislative branch exercises lawmaking power that takes precedence
over the lawmaking powers respectively exercised by the executive and
judicial branches.
The facts that this separation of powers is not absolute, and that the
allocation is complicated rather than simple, in no way detract from the
simple assertion that, within the domains of lawmaking in which they are
constitutionally permitted to operate and within the differing means by
which they make their pronouncements, any conflict between the legislative will and the judicial will must be resolved in favor of the former. It is
assumed, therefore, that within these boundaries the judicial branch
must remain appropriately deferential to the properly promulgated views
of the legislature.
Id at 7-8 (footnote omitted).
See, for example, Brody, 29 Akron L Rev at 313-21 (cited in note 333); Eskridge,
Dynamic Statutory Interpretationat 8 (cited in note 198); Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalismin Recent Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation:Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 Stan L Rev 1, 2 (1998); Andrew E.
Taslitz, Interpretive Method and the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Call for a Politically
Realistic Hermeneutics, 32 Harv J on Legis 329, 379 (1995). See also William W. Eskridge,
Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory Interpretation, 66 U Chi L Rev 671
(1999); Bernard W. Bell, Legislative History Without Legislative Intent: the Public Justification Approach to Statutory Interpretation,60 Ohio St L J 1 (1999).
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one of three categories of originalist method.33 Besides discerning
the intent of Congress, originalists also refer to congressional
purpose 7 and/or the strict text33 as authority for the meaning of
the statute. 339
1. IntentionalistAnalysis.
Sexual harassment is not mentioned in the legislative history
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. However, the legislative history of
Title VII reveals the lawmaker's transformative intent. The plan
of the Act,3 40 as stated in the House Judiciary report, was "to
eliminate" unlawful discrimination.341 While Congress's transformative intent with regard to race, religion, color, and national
origin is clear, some may argue that this intent with regard to sex
is less clear. By some accounts, the word "sex" was inserted into
the statute as a subversive measure.342 Originally, the statute
Eskridge, Dynamic StatutoryInterpretationat 14-25 (cited in note 198).
Id at 25-34.
Id at 34-47.
9 Jane Schacter notes that "It is common, even mundane, to observe that the Supreme Court's approach to statutory interpretation has become increasingly 'textualist' in
character - that is, more oriented to statutory language and the assertedly 'objective'
meaning of statutory text than to the collective subjective intent behind the legislation."
Schacter, 51 Stan L Rev at 2 (cited in note 335).
'o Andrew E. Taslitz discusses the view of intent as legislative "plan":
"7

One can view collective intent as a concept related to, but slightly different from, individual intent. As Justice Breyer has noted, we commonly
ascribe group intent to group actions without practical difficulties....
Recognizing that law does not result from a single action, but from various interacting activities, leads to deriving intention from a series of acts,
emphasizing context and plans. To ascertain a group's intent may require
asking: "Of what type of plan would this action be a reasonable first
step?" This inquiry avoids ascribing a subjective motive to a group, yet
remains consistent with both the common usage of "intent" as applied to
groups and the sense that group activity is goal-oriented. By focusing on
a group's plan, as revealed by its context, action, and words, this inquiry
enables us to determine group legislative intent.
Taslitz, 32 Harv J on Legis at 379 (cited in note 335), citing Stephen Breyer, On the Uses
of Legislative History in InterpretingStatutes, 65 S Cal L Rev 845, 864 (1992) and Brian
Bix, Law, Language and Legal Indeterminacy 187 (Oxford 1993).
U1 HR Rep No 88-914 (1963), reprinted in EEOC, Legislative History of Titles VII and
XI of Civil Rights Act of 1964 2026 (GPO 1968).
32 Susan Silberman Blasi, The Adjudication of Same-Sex Sexual HarassmentClaims
under Title VII, 12 Lab Law 291, 297-98 (1996); see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 Yale L J 1281, 1283-84 (1991) ("[S]ex discrimination in private employment was forbidden under federal law only in a last minute joking
'us boys' attempt to defeat Title VII's prohibition on racial discrimination. Sex was added
as a prohibited ground of discrimination when this attempted reductio ad absurdum failed
and the law passed anyway."). But see Robert Bird, More than a CongressionalJoke: A
Fresh Look at the Legislative History of Sex Discriminationof the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 3
Wm & Mary J Women & L 137, 138 (1997) ("Congress added sex as a result of subtle po-
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only prohibited discrimination because of race, color, national
origin and religion. Yet, some opposed the transformative mission
of the legislation as to those forms of discrimination. For example, Representative George Meader published separate remarks
in the House Judiciary Committee Report stating:
The title ... will have far-reaching consequences on both

management and labor; contains onerous provisions for
recordkeeping, inspection, and reporting; and constitutes
an important but ill-devised limitation upon the area of
discretion and decisionmaking of both American businesses and American workers.343
The Minority Report from the House Judiciary Committee stated,
"The depth, the revolutionary meaning of this act, is almost beyond description. It cannot be circumscribed, it cannot be said
that it goes this far and no farther."3" Opponents of the bill added
the word "sex" as a strategy for derailing the legislation.34 Congress, they thought, could not pass such an extensive measure
that included among its prohibitions discrimination because of
sex. Rather than detract from the transformative intent of Title
VII, opponents' strategy for defeating the measure is a testament
to the far-reaching nature of the statute as a whole. To the opponents' surprise, Congress passed the legislation, extending the
transformative purpose to eliminate discrimination based on sex.
The legislative history of subsequent amendments makes
clear that the revolutionary aims of the statute included the prohibition of sex discrimination. The report on the Pregnancy Discrimination Act from the Senate Committee on Human Resources
states: "Congress passed Title VII in 1964 to eliminate discrimination in employment on the basis of race, sex, color, national
origin, and religion."3"" In amending that law in 1972, Congress
noted that "discrimination against women ... is to be accorded

the same degree of social concern given to any type of unlawful

litical pressure from individuals, who for varying reasons, were serious about protecting
the rights of women.").

HR Rep No 88-914 (1963), reprinted in EEOC, Legislative History at 2057 (cited in
note 341) (statement of Rep George Meader).
, Minority Report upon Proposed Civil Rights Act of 1963, Committee on Judiciary
Substitute for HR 7152, HR Rep No 88-914 (1963), reprinted in EEOC, Legislative History
at 2069 (cited in note 341).
See note 342 and accompanying text.
' Amending Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, S Rep No 95-331, 95th Cong, 1st Sess
2 (1977).
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discrimination.""" Thus, the legislative history of Title VII indicates a congressional intent to transform the workplace through,
among other things, the elimination of sex discrimination.
2. PurposiveAnalysis.
The purpose of Title VII is to transform the workplace to create equality. The severe or pervasive standard as a doctrinal
cloaking of proven discrimination is contrary to the statute's
original purpose. The Court in Faragherv City of Boca Raton34
explained that the severe and pervasive standards "for judging
hostility are sufficiently demanding to ensure that Title VII does
not become a general civility code. Properly applied, these standards will filter out complaints attacking the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing."349
Since, as the Court explained, Title VII is not a general civility code, it does not require employers to insure that their managers and supervisors say "good morning" upon arriving to work.
It does not mandate "please" or "thank you" or chewing with
closed mouths. Title VII does, however, prohibit discrimination,
which includes harassment. Many "jokes" are not discriminatory,
but when someone discriminates and calls it a joke, the fact that
he calls what he has done a joke does nothing to cure the harm.
In outlining the parameters of sexual harassment, MacKinnon
explained:
Trivialization of sexual harassment has been a major
means through which its invisibility has been enforced.
Humor, which may reflect unconscious hostility, has been
a major form of that trivialization. As Eleanor Zuckerman
has noted, "Although it has become less acceptable openly
to express prejudices against women, nevertheless, these
feelings remain under the surface, often taking the form of
humor, which makes the issue seem trivial and unimpor0
tant.

35

" HR Rep No 238, 92d Cong, 2d Sess 5 (June 2, 1971), reprinted in 1972 USCCAN
2137, 2141.
118 S Ct 2275 (1998).
Id at 2283-84 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Macinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women at 52 (cited in note 116),
quoting Eleanor L. Zuckerman, Masculinity and the Changing Woman, in Women and
Men: Roles, Attitudes and Power Relationships 65 (Radcliffe Club NY 1975).
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The label "joke" is simply an effort to legitimate the assertion of
dominance, to mystify and normalize oppression so that discrimination remains merely a question of civility.
In Sink v Knox County Hospital,51 a co-worker of the plaintiff
suggested that she give him an early birthday present by spending the night in a hotel with him.352 Plaintiff did not believe that
the co-worker's request was genuine but warned him that she did
not appreciate the comment. 53 Another co-worker who was present told her "not to take it personally because it was only a
joke."5 4 The first co-worker also asked plaintiff whether she was
sleeping with her boyfriend and whether she knew how to masturbate.3

55

Plaintiff's co-worker also made various attacks on her

competence.5 ' In granting summary judgment for defendant, the
court concluded that the explicitly sexual conduct of plaintiff's coworkers did "not rise to the necessary level of severity or pervasiveness." 7
The question should not be whether the harassment was severe. The question should simply be whether what happened was
harassment because of sex - that is, due to some fantasy of sexual desire (explicit or not), biological difference, sexuality or gender identity. That is a question to be determined by the factfinder. If what happened was discrimination because of sex, then
the employer has violated the statute. The Supreme Court, by the
severe or pervasive standard, is not only failing to pursue the
purpose of the statute, but is unnecessarily complicating the
analysis. The question should be simple: did the employer harass
based on sex? If so, the employer discriminated against the employee and thus violated the statute.5 ' The element of degree, in
the liability stage, is an unnecessary and counterproductive layer
of complexity to a straightforward statute.
Consider the Court's own example from Oncale v Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc...:
900 F Supp 1065 (S D Ind 1995).
Id at 1069.
Id.
Id.
Sink, 900 F Supp at 1069.
Id at 1070. See also Schultz, 107 Yale L J at 1732 (cited in note 29) (describing
"non-sexual" harassment as attacks on women's competence).
17
Sink, 900 F Supp at 1075. See also Long v Eastfield College, 88 F3d 300 (5th Cir
1996) (holding offensive joke concerning condoms was insufficient to establish hostile work
environment claim).
'
See text accompanying notes 172-73, explaining that sexual harassment is sex
discrimination.
5
523 US 75 (1998).
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In same-sex (as in all) harassment cases, that inquiry [regarding the objective severity of harassment] requires
careful consideration of the social context in which particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its target. A
professional football player's working environment is not
severely or pervasively abusive, for example, if the coach
smacks him on the buttocks as he heads onto the field even if the same behavior would reasonably be experienced as abusive by the coach's secretary (male or female)
back at the office. 6°
Is the distinction here that one smack on the butt is severe or
pervasive while the other is not, as the Court suggests? Or is the
distinction that a random smack, which is not individually directed and which is one of fifty or so arbitrarily administered
smacks, is not discrimination (and probably not unwelcomed),
while an individual and directed smack of a secretary in an office
is discrimination (and probably unwelcomed)? Imagine that the
coach administered the smack on the butt to only one player, the
same player, sporadically or every time he entered the field.
Imagine that the coach administered the smack despite the football player's objection. The Court acknowledges that "The real
social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the
words used or the physical acts performed.""' Nevertheless, the
purpose of the statute is realized not by asking whether the discrimination or harassment was severe; rather the question is
whether the conduct (mild or severe) was harassment because of
sex.
The Court in Oncale reasoned that Title VII does not prohibit
"genuine but innocuous differences in the ways men and women
routinely interact with members of the same sex and of the opposite sex." 62 As the Court noted elsewhere, "[S]imple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious)
will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment."363 By this analysis, the Court stated explicitly its intention to maintain the status quo. The fact that the
action in question is commonplace, the fact that it describes an
Id at 81.
31

Id at 81-82.
Id at 81.
Faragher,118 S Ct at 2283 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

260

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGOLEGAL FORUM [1999:

interaction between people that is "normal," does not mean it is
not a violation of the statute. Inequality is commonplace. It is
normal for racial minorities to experience discrimination. It is
normal for women to experience discrimination. The central
problem that the severe or pervasive framework fails to address
is the possibility that normal behavior, when non-consensual, is
not only discriminatory, but a key impediment to equality in the
workplace. Title VII is transformative; it is designed to rectify the
way that people commonly interact. The statute does not aim to
create a workplace where harassment is not severe or pervasive,
a workplace that is bearable or tolerable. Rather, the statute
aims to eliminate discrimination because of sex in the workplace.
3. Textual Analysis.
Nothing in the language of Title VII explicitly prohibits sexual harassment."' However, accepting the Court's definition of
sexual harassment as sex discrimination, nothing in the language
of the statute permits harassment that is not severe or pervasive.
The statute provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."' 5
An employer who is covered by the Act may be excused from
these prohibitions with regard to hiring where the individual's
religion, sex, or national origin constitutes a bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ") reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise."' In other
words, an employer may discriminate in hiring only where such
discrimination amounts to a bona fide occupational qualification.
Absent a BFOQ, the statute provides for the elimination of sex
discrimination with regard to the failure or refusal to hire or discharge, or other discrimination with respect to compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.3"7
See Franke, 49 Stan L Rev at 702 (cited in note 29).
42 USC § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
42 USC § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1994). See generally Comment, The Inequality Approach
and the BFOQ: Use of Feminist Theory to Reinterpret the Title VII BFOQ Exception, 1993

Wis L Rev 261 (discussing BFOQ exception in context of women-only employment).
" 42 USC § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
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In Oncale, Ellerth,3 ' and Faragher,the Court relies primarily
370 for the propoon its previous decisions in Meritor389 and Harris
sition that harassment must be severe or pervasive to be actionable. 1 This proposition contradicts the plain language of the
statute. The statute states that it is an unlawful employment
practice "otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment."372 The words "to discriminate" are unconditional.
The statute does not say that it is unlawful "to discriminate severely." It does not say that it is unlawful "to discriminate pervasively" or "unreasonably." Nothing in the statute as amended can
sustain the queries in Harris regarding whether the discrimination is frequent or physical (as opposed to merely offensive) or
whether the discrimination unreasonably interferes with performance (as opposed to reasonably interfering).373 The statute
gives the very simple mandate that no sex discrimination is reasonable.
Sexual harassment pertains to the statute's prohibition of
discrimination with respect to the "terms, conditions or privileges" of employment. This provision is in the same section as the
statute's prohibition of discrimination in hiring and discharge.
Since the passage of the 1991 Amendment, courts make no distinction, for purposes of liability supported by direct evidence, in
hiring and discharge cases between an employer who discriminates a little versus one who really discriminates. Even in sexual
harassment cases, courts do not pause to examine the severity or
pervasiveness of the discrimination where the harassment involves a tangible job consequence. The Supreme Court distinguishes between sexual harassment cases involving a tangible job
consequence and those lacking a tangible job consequence.374 Both
are cognizable under Title VII, but the latter requires sexual harassment that is severe or pervasive. 75 Sexual harassment cases
resulting in adverse tangible job consequences are a hybrid of the
discharge and terms or conditions provisions. In sexual harassment cases in the absence of a tangible job consequence - pure
terms, conditions, or privileges cases - the Court requires plain118 S Ct 2257 (1998).
477 US 57 (1986).
" 510 US 17 (1993).
371

See notes 180-95 and accompanying text.

42 USC § 2000e-2(a)(1).
See notes 252-331 and accompanying text.
.. Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2264-65.
.. Id at 2265.
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tiffs to prove that the harassment they experienced was severe or
pervasive. In other words, in pure terms or conditions cases, the
Court requires a higher degree of discrimination, explicitly permitting some discrimination because of sex. This interpretation
produces an inconsistency that departs from the language of the
statute.
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYER LIABILITY AND THE
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE CONFLICT WITH THE SEVERE OR
PERVASIVE STANDARD

Despite its reaffirmation of the severe or pervasive standard,
the Court during the 1998 Term reached several important conclusions regarding sexual harassment law that will further the
goal of workplace equality. The Court held, among other things,
that same-sex sexual harassment is cognizable under the
statute376 and that employers may be liable for sexual harassment
by supervisors.3" The progressiveness of these decisions, especially the decision regarding employer liability, stands in contrast
to the affirmation of the severe or pervasive standard, which in
turn conflicts with the affirmative defense conditioning employer's liability.
A. The Vicarious Liability and Affirmative Defense Frameworks
The central holding of both Ellerth and Faragheris that employers may be liable for sexual harassment committed by a supervisor in certain circumstances.3

78

Applying principles from the

Restatement(Second) of Agency, the Court concluded that an employer would be vicariously liable for the actions of its supervisors
where there is a tangible job consequence, or in the absence of a
tangible job consequence, where the sexual harassment is severe
or pervasive, and the employer is unable to prove the affirmative
defense.3 79 The affirmative defense created by the Court "com-

prises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm other...Oncale v Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc, 523 US 75, 79-80 (1998).
"' Faragherv City of Boca Raton, 118 S Ct 2275, 2278-79 (1998); Burlington Indus-

tries v Ellerth, 118 S Ct 2257, 2270 (1998).
378 Faragher,118 S Ct at 2278-79; Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2270.
Faragher,118 S Ct at 2292-93.
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wise." 8 The Court noted that proof that the employer had promulgated an anti-harassment policy with complaint procedures
would be sufficient, but not necessary, to satisfy the first element
of the defense. 381' And proof that an employee failed to take advantage of the existing complaint procedures would normally be sufficient, but not necessary, to satisfy the second element.382
B. Employer Liability
The Court's recognition of employer liability for sexual harassment by supervisors is significant. This result will further the
goal of creating equality in the workplace. The reasoning of the
Court in reaching this goal, however, distances employers from
the sexual harassment that occurs in the workplace in the absence of a tangible job consequence, rationalizing a framework
that requires sexual harassment in such instances to be severe or
pervasive.
1. Supervisory Employees.
When there is a tangible job consequence, the employer's role
in the sexual harassment is clear,83 but when there is no tangible
job consequence, courts view the harm as less real and employers
as being removed from the employment practice.
The Court implicitly characterizes employers as merely indirect participants in acts of discrimination by supervisors where
there is no tangible job consequence. This assumption is illustrated by the Court's characterization of the issue in Ellerth: "The
question presented on certiorari is whether [plaintiff] can state a
claim of quid pro quo harassment, but the issue of real concern to
the parties is whether Burlington has vicarious liability for [the
supervisor's] alleged misconduct, rather than liability limited to
its own negligence." 3' From this perspective, the supervisor is the
party that acts while the employer is passive.
Courts' proximity analysis using the severe or pervasive
standard arises in the context of distancing the employer from

381

Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2270.
Id.
Id.

See Faragher,118 S Ct at 2284-85.
Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2265. The issue presented in the petition for certiorari was
"Whether a claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment may be stated under Title VII ....
where the plaintiff employee has neither submitted to the sexual advances of the alleged
harasser nor suffered any tangible effects on the compensation, terms, conditions or
privileges of employment as a consequence of a refusal to submit to those advances?" Id
(alteration in original).
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the harassment. When the employer's involvement has been removed from the sexual harassment - when there is no tangible
job consequence - the plaintiff must prove that the sexual harassment was severe or pervasive and the employer has an opportunity to establish an affirmative defense.
The Court is able to presume distant employer responsibility
only by ignoring the simplest interpretation of the statute. According to the statute, agents of the employer are the employer.
The statute defines employer as "a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce.., and any agent of such a person.""8 5 It then
proscribes discriminatory conduct by employers, which incorporates conduct of the employers' agents by definition. The question, then, is who is an agent, not whether an employer should be
liable for the actions of its agent. Supervisors, empowered by the
employer, are agents. Supervisors must therefore be read into the
definition of employer in order to avoid rendering superfluous the
language of the statute. If the supervisor acts, according to the
statute, the employer has acted."' 8 There is no need to assess the
liability vicariously.
The Court circumvents the clear language and intent of the
statute by substituting new standards for employer liability
rather than simply giving content to the word "agent." Consider
an alternate statute that separately defined "agent" and separately proscribed the agent's actions.387 In applying that statute,
it would be appropriate for the Court to consider the issue of vicarious liability." It should not, however, have done so given the
statute in its current form.
2. Non-Supervisory Employees.
The Court's decision regarding employer liability for supervisors may have implications for claims regarding employer liability for the actions of non-supervisors. In such cases, courts may
further distance employer fault from sexual harassment.

42 USC § 2000e(b) (1994).
A simple indication of the Court's error in this regard is its conclusion that "a tangible employment action taken by the supervisor becomes for Title VII purposes the act of

the employer." Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2269 (emphasis added). This is contrary to the language of the statute which provides that the actions of an agent are the actions of the
employer. If supervisors and managers are removed from this connection to the employer,

then the inclusion of "agent" in the definition of employer is superfluous because it adds
nothing to what the common law already provides.
'

The statute, for example, defines employment agencies separately. See 42 USC

§ 2000e(c) (1994).
'

See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(1) (1958).
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Tangible job consequences (hiring, discharge, promotion) are
generally implemented by employees having some supervisory
authority. As a result, employers will generally not be liable for
sexual harassment by a non-supervisor that involves a tangible
job consequence. However, because non-supervisory employees
engage in sexual harassment where there is no tangible job consequence, the Court may have felt compelled to reaffirm the severe or pervasive limitation on employer liability in the absence
of a tangible job consequence and create an affirmative defense
not provided in the statute.
Although the issue of employer liability for sexual harassment by non-supervisory employees was not before the Court
during the 1998 term, the Restatement sections discussed by the
Court could arguably apply to such harassment. The Restatement
(Second) of Agency § 219(2), discussed by the Court, provides as
follows:
A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of their employment, unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of
the master, or
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on
behalf of the principal and there was reliance
upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency
relation."9
Both subsections (b) and (d), the subsections that the Court considered in evaluating employer liability due to the actions of a
supervisor,"9 could be applied to impose employer liability for the
conduct of non-supervisory employees. The Court evinced considerable skepticism that the second component of subsection (d),
the aided in the agency relation standard that applies to supervisors, would apply to non-supervisors.391 Nevertheless, subsection

See Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2267, quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2).
See id at 2267.
=" The Court noted that "neither the EEOC nor any court of appeals to have consid""

ered the issue' had applied the agency relation standard to non-supervisors. Id at 2268.
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(b) and the first component of subsection (d) arguably should apply to the conduct of non-supervisors.
Under subsection (b), an employer should be liable for sexual
harassment by a non-supervisor that is attributable to the employer's own negligence. Nothing in this Restatement section or
the Court's discussion of it limits its application to the actions of
supervisors. 92 This is especially true in light of the Court's observation that under this provision an employer can be liable for
conduct outside the scope of the employee's employment if the
employer knew or should have known about the conduct and
failed to stop it.393 The Court did not resolve the issue of employer
liability for a supervisor's conduct under this subsection of the
Restatement because "[n]egligence sets a minimum standard for
employer liability under Title VII" and the plaintiff sought a more
stringent standard.394 Nevertheless, employers, at a minimum,
should be liable for sexual harassment by a non-supervisor that
occurs because an employer has turned a blind eye to harassment
among co-workers.
In addition to subsection (b), the first component of subsection (d) should provide a limited basis for employer liability for
sexual harassment by non-supervisory co-workers. Under the
first component of subsection (d), an employer is liable when an
employee uses apparent authority.395 The apparent authority
standard is different from the agency relation standard in that
the latter involves actual authority."' The Court opined that an
employer could be liable for sexual harassment by a nonsupervisory co-worker in the unusual case where there is a reasonable false impression that the co-worker was a supervisor,
when he in fact was not.397
The Court did not discuss subsection (c).398 Nevertheless, an

argument could be made that employers have a nondelegable
duty to provide a workplace free from harassment.399 Under this
See id at 2267.
Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2267.
Id.
Id.
Id at 2267-68.
Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2267-68.
Id at 2267 ("There is no contention... that a nondelegable duty is involved").
See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII Liability of Employers For Sexual HarassmentCommitted by TheirSupervisors, 81 Cornell L
Rev 66, 94-97 (1995); Michael J. Phillips, Employer Sexual Harassment Liability Under
Agency Principles:A Second Look at Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 44 Vand L Rev
1229, 1252-55 (1991); Note, Title VII Sexual Harassment:Recognizing an Employer's NonDelegable Duty to Prevent a Hostile Workplace, 95 Colum L Rev 724, 742-48 (1995). But
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theory, employers could be liable for sexual harassment by nonsupervisors.
With the door opened to arguments for employer liability for
sexual harassment by non-supervisory co-workers, it is less surprising that the Court felt compelled, contrary to the language
and intent of the statute, to limit the scope of that liability by reaffirming the severe or pervasive standard and creating an affirmative defense. The limitation of the affirmative defense, however, should apply to circumstances not specified by the statute
- employer liability for the actions of non-supervisory co-workers
- rather than employer liability for the actions of supervisors.
C. The Affirmative Defense
Under the affirmative defense established by the Court in
Ellerth and Faragher,an employer must exercise reasonable care
to prevent and correct sexually harassing behavior.4"" In
Faragher,the Court noted that the primary purpose of Title VII
"is not to provide redress but to avoid harm."4 1 The Court used
this observation to explain the first element of the affirmative
defense. The Court reasoned that because employers' development of sexual harassment policies and procedures will prevent
sexual harassment, employers should be given an incentive to
develop such procedures:
It would therefore implement clear statutory policy and
complement the Government's Title VII enforcement efforts to recognize the employer's affirmative obligation to
prevent violations and give credit here to employers who
make reasonable efforts to discharge their duty. Indeed, a
theory of vicarious liability for misuse of supervisory
power would be at odds with the statutory policy if it
failed to provide employers with some such incentive.4"2
By allowing employers to avoid liability by adopting policies and
procedures, the Court creates a tremendous disincentive for employers to go beyond procedures and create actual equality in the
see General Building ContractorsAssn, Inc v Pennsylvania, 458 US 375, 395-96 (1982)
(rejecting argument that section 1981 imposes nondelegable duty to see that discrimination does not occur in the workplace).
01 Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2270; Faragher,118 S Ct at 2293. See also notes 378-82 and
accompanying text.
'0' Faragher,118 S Ct at 2292.
"

Id.
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workplace. Title VII and the threat of liability provide an incentive to employers not only to create sexual harassment policies
and procedures, but also to take affirmative steps to educate employees and monitor the workplace, thus preventing discriminatory behavior. However, the first element of the affirmative defense permits employers to abdicate responsibility for the actual
harms of sexual harassment as long as they have taken the perfunctory step of establishing an official policy that includes a
visible enforcement mechanism.
If the aim of Title VII is to avoid harm, then the Court should
recant that aspect of sexual harassment law that acquiesces to
certain forms of sexual harassment. The severe or pervasive
standard and the employer incentive concept are at odds with
each other. The severe or pervasive standard, rather than preventing or discouraging instances of sexual harassment, enables
sexual harassment. The severe or pervasive standard creates a
gray area of permissible discrimination. Employees (potential
harassers and potential victims) are informed by repeated Supreme Court proclamations that some sexual harassment, mild or
sporadic sexual harassment, is permissible. Potential harassers
are then on notice that some sexually harassing behavior is condoned. Potential victims are on notice that under certain circumstances, when they experience sexual harassment, they will have
no recourse.
The availability of an affirmative defense in the absence of a
tangible job consequence is a redundancy that exaggerates the
severe or pervasive requirement. Under the current standard, if a
plaintiff proves a hostile work environment, then he or she has
proven harassment so objectively severe or pervasive that it alters the terms or conditions of employment. Since plaintiff has
proven this degree of harassment, allowing an affirmative defense for employers, based on lack of knowledge or the existence
of a policy and procedures, is unreasonable and contrary to the
statute. The employer in Ellerth, for example, was given the opportunity to establish an affirmative defense despite plaintiff's
proof that she suffered severe or pervasive sexual harassment by
a supervisor."'
The severe or pervasive standard also conflicts with the first
element of the affirmative defense because it impedes effective
Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2271. The defendant in Faragher,however, failed to take even
the minimal precaution of establishing a visible anti-harassment policy and procedure for
its many "far-flung" departments. Faragher,118 S Ct at 2293.
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sexual harassment policies. Under the severe or pervasive standard, employers are obligated to avoid some of the harms of sexual harassment, but not all. Employers, as a result, lack guidance
as to what is and is not permissible. The murkiness of the severe
or pervasive standard frustrates clear and consistent application
of company policies and is at cross purposes with the statute's
aim.
A plaintiff's failure to take advantage of existing complaint
procedures is sufficient to show that he or she did not reasonably
pursue preventive or corrective opportunities or avoid harm.4 "4
The second element of the defense imposes on victims of sexual
harassment "a coordinate duty to avoid or mitigate harm."" 5 According to the Court, an employer is not liable when a plaintiff
unreasonably fails to use available preventive measures to avoid
the harm:
If the victim could have avoided harm, no liability should
be found against the employer who had taken reasonable
care, and if damages could reasonably have been mitigated
no award against a liable employer should reward a plaintiff for what her own efforts could have avoided.4 8
This element of the affirmative defense ignores the reality that
reporting sexual harassment may have serious consequences for
the victim. 40 7 Whether or not there is an official anti-harassment
policy, common workplace environments often make reporting
sexual harassment equivalent to a letter of resignation. Victims
of sexual harassment are often afraid of reprisal from supervisors
or co-workers. 48 It is no coincidence that none of the plaintiffs in
Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2270; Faragher,118 S Ct at 2293.
Faragher,118 S Ct at 2292. The Court's affirmative defense transplants mitigation
as a factor affecting remedy to a factor affecting both liability and remedy. The affirmative
defense that the Court creates does not limit the defense to the contemporaneous acts of
the victim. Employers are freed from responsibility for particular instances of discrimination by the subsequent conduct of the plaintiff. How can a plaintiff avoid what has already
happened? Once an employee has suffered discrimination, the relevant action is complete.
The employer's liability is determinable. The plaintiff's subsequent acts are irrelevant to
the question of liability, though they arguably may have some bearing on damages.
4w
Id.
See, for example, notes 410-11 and accompanying text.
See Patricia Davis, Woman Deputy is Accused of Sex Harassment of 2 Men, Wash
Post C1 (Nov 19, 1992) (reporting that the Women's Legal Defense Fund finds that sexual
harassment is "significantly underreported" primarily due to fear of retaliation); Karen De
Witt, The Thomas Nomination: The Evolving Concept of Sexual Harassment, NY Times
A28 (Oct 13, 1991) (reporting that a United States Merit Systems Protection Board survey
shows that 42 percent of female workers experienced sexual harassment but only 5 percent of those women reported the harassment); Deb Riechmann, Men and Women Debate
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Meritor, Harris,Faragher,or Ellerth made official reports of the
harassment."9 Many victims of sexual harassment are unwilling
to risk ostracism as well as loss of job, goodwill, training, and potential for advancement by reporting the harassment. For example, the plaintiff in Morrison v Carleton Woolen Mills, Inc41° testified that after reporting sexual harassment,
[M]ost of the people with whom she had worked for years
would no longer speak to her ... ostensibly because dis-

couraged by management from doing so. The few that did
were reprimanded by their supervisors afterward. Morrison felt that some of her co-workers would no longer cooperate with her, thereby making her job much more difficult, and that one of her new supervisors ... would occa-

sionally assign her excessive work. [This supervisor], according to Morrison, would also follow her around and look
for flaws in her work, and would often blame her for mistakes that were not of her own doing.41
Requiring victims of workplace harassment to be superheroes is
not equality. Instead of avoiding the harms of sexual harassment,
the second element of the affirmative defense treats employers,
rather than employees, as potential victims, absolving them of
the responsibility to act affirmatively to end sex discrimination.
Given the possibility of retaliation, the severe or pervasive
standard also conflicts with the second element of the affirmative
defense because of the possibility that the harassment may be
viewed as mild or sporadic. On one hand, plaintiffs must report
instances of sexual harassment in order to avoid a determination
that they were complicit or unreasonable. On the other hand,
they risk retaliation1 2 and not being taken seriously because others may view the action as merely a joke or flirtation." Thus,
having come forward, receiving no redress from the employer,
What's Now OK to Say and Do in Workplace, Chi Trib C2 (Mar 31, 1998) (reporting that
the co-president of the National Women's Law Center believes that sexual harassment is
underreported).
Of all the Supreme Court sexual harassment cases, only the plaintiff in Oncale
officially reported the harassment. Oncale, 523 US at 77.
4108 F3d 429 (1st Cir 1997).
4,1 Id at 440-41.
4M2 See, for example, Tunis v Corning Glass Works, 747 F Supp 951, 954 (S D NY
1990) (describing sexual harassment by co-workers of a female employee who reported
displays of pornography that were in violation of company policy).
,13 See discussion of instances of sexual harassment characterized as jokes in notes
350-58 and accompanying text.
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and lacking redress in the courts, the employee, for her courage,
must live with the possibility of reprisal or decreased goodwill.414
The combination of the severe and pervasive requirement and the
second element of the affirmative defense can only silence victims
of sexual harassment.
The exchange between the judges on the panel in Long v
Eastfield College"5 illustrates the dilemma faced by plaintiffs.
The majority held that plaintiffs complaint about a sexual joke
did not allege sufficiently severe or pervasive harassment to survive the defendant's motion for summary judgment.41 Nevertheless, for purposes of her retaliation claim, the majority held that
plaintiff had presented evidence sufficient to survive summary
judgment that she reasonably believed that her supervisor's conduct violated Title VII. 4 7 Dissenting in part, Judge DeMoss argued that the plaintiffs "reasonable belief" was insufficient to
satisfy the statutory requirement that retaliation claims be based
on opposition to an unlawful employment practice. According to
Judge DeMoss:
The statutory text is clear and unambiguous: "because he
has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice by this chapter." The statute says "made." It does
not say "because he has opposed any practice which he
reasonably
"418 thinks or believes is an unlawful employment
prac tice.

Fortunately for the plaintiff, Judge DeMoss's opinion was a
dissenting opinion, but that outcome is by no means assured in
future cases. Plaintiffs face a dilemma created by the opinions in
the Supreme Court's 1998 Term. The sexual harassment victim
may choose to report sexual harassment in order to preempt an
affirmative defense that she failed to act reasonably, thus taking
the chance that the sexual harassment will not be viewed as sufficiently severe or pervasive. In such a case, plaintiff will have no
redress in court for the sexual harassment that she or he experienced and may also face difficulty proving that his or her belief
that the conduct was sexual harassment was reasonable for purSee generally Note, Civil Rights -Hostile Work Environment Harassment - Duty
of Employer to Eliminate 'Cold Shoulder Treatment", 64 Tenn L Rev 537 (1997).
,'

88 F3d 300 (5th Cir 1996).

Id at 309. Long was one of two plaintiffs alleging sexual harassment and retaliation.
11

Id at 308-09.

' Id at 310 (DeMoss concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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poses of a retaliation claim.419 Alternatively, she can continue to
suffer the sexual harassment in silence.
Under the second element of the affirmative defense, when
there is proof of sexual harassment by a supervisor that is severe
or pervasive, employers can escape liability for the sexual harassment by blaming the victim - proving that the plaintiff acted
unreasonably so as to lift responsibility for proven unwelcome
severe or pervasive sexual harassment from the employer.
Not being blamed for the violence done to us has been a continual struggle for women. Even when a plaintiff has proven severe or pervasive sexual harassment, the Supreme Court and the
employer still look
to shift the blame.2 ° The claim is often that
42
"she wanted it." "What was she wearing, after all?" "Why didn't
she leave?" "Did she even fight/protest/report?" The issue of
blaming the victim is an issue of believing the victim. As MacKinnon notes, "women report rapes when we feel we will be believed. The rapes that have been reported, as they have been reported, are the kinds of rapes women think will be believed when
we report them."422 Examining a plaintiff's use of an employer's
existing policy for the purpose of determining liability constitutes
doctrinal doubt of individuals as victims of sexual harassment.
IV. TRANSFORMING WORK

Is a world without sex inequality a world without fun? If we
take all unwelcome impositions of the fantasy of sex out of the
workplace, are we left with an environment that has less joy and
is less bearable? 2 How much more freedom would there be in the
workplace if sex (fantasy) were only done to others mutually or
consensually? How could we accomplish it?
To begin with, courts should cease attempting to delineate
degrees of discrimination in the liability phase. Either a plaintiff
satisfies her evidentiary burden of proving discrimination by a
See notes 213-30 and accompanying text.
See MacKinnon, A Rally against Rape, in Feminism Unmodified at 82 (cited in
note 1) ("Women believe that not only will we not be believed by the police, not only will
the doctors treat us in degrading ways, but when we go to court, the incident will not be
seen from our point of view. It is unfortunate that these fears have, on the whole, proved
accurate.").
421 See Note, 77 Cornell L Rev at 1576-77 (cited in note 18).
'" MacKinnon, A Rally Against Rape, in Feminism Unmodified at 81 (cited in note 1).
42
See MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women at 51 (cited in note 116)
("Noncooperative women (including women who carry resistance to the point of official
complaint) are accused of trying to take away one of the few compensations for an otherwise meaningless, drab, and mechanized workplace existence, one of life's little joys.").
"
42
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preponderance of the evidence or she does not. If the conduct is
discriminatory, then the degree to which it affected an employee's
terms and conditions of employment may be considered in the
remedial phase.
The 1991 Amendment to the Civil Rights Act limits the relief
available to a plaintiff that proves discrimination that is a motivating factor but not a "but for" cause:
On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under
section 2000e-2(m) of this title and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the same
action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the court -

(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief
(except as provided in clause (ii), and attorney's
fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under section
2000e-2(m) of this title; and
(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order
requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring,
promotion, or payment, described in subparagraph (A). 4"
Therefore, applying the 1991 Amendment to sexual harassment,
in the absence of a tangible job consequence, when a plaintiff
proves by direct evidence that sexual harassment by an employer
(including a supervisor) is a motivating factor affecting the terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, he or she has proven a
violation of the statute, even if the sexual harassment was not
severe or pervasive. Likewise, in the absence of a tangible job
consequence where a plaintiff proves by direct evidence that sexual harassment by a non-supervisory employee is a motivating
factor affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, an employer that knew or should have known of conditions
facilitating sexual harassment should be liable if it fails to establish the affirmative defense outlined in Ellerth and Faragher,
even if the sexual harassment was not severe or pervasive. In any
case in which a plaintiff proves sexual harassment that is a moti-

'2'

42 USC § 2000e-5(g)(2XB) (1994).
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vating factor but is not severe or pervasive, plaintiff's remedy
should be limited as provided in the statute.425
By providing a remedy but limiting it to declaratory and injunctive relief and attorneys' fees, the statute produces at least
two important results. First, it acknowledges and provides a basis
for stopping the harm of sexual harassment even when it manifests as normal heterosexual male behavior. Second, it alleviates
concerns that removal of the severe or pervasive standard would
cause the agency and judicial system to be overwhelmed with
new complaints.
In addition, to the extent that the Court wishes to provide
incentives to employers to prevent sexual harassment in the
workplace and to reward them for their efforts, such incentives
should function to foster, rather than retard, the transformative
intent or dynamic nature of the statute. In that regard, the employer may establish an affirmative defense to any claim of sexual harassment by a supervisor if the employer can prove that it
created an equal workplace prior to the harassment. In other
words, if an employer satisfies its responsibility to create equality
in the workplace, then the employer will not be held liable for the
subsequent sexually harassing actions of its employees. I do not
attempt to outline an equal workplace here. However, examples
of factors that may be included in an employer's proof of equality
in the workplace are the diversity of the workforce at all levels,
equity in pay and responsibility, accessible complaint procedures,
proactive education and monitoring of the workplace, and investigation and redress of sexual harassment complaints. Of course,
an employer may choose not to create an equal workplace, but if
the employer does not, then there should be no defense to a plaintiff's proof of even mild or sporadic sexual harassment.
CONCLUSION

The enactments of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1991 are
more than symbol or gesture or empty promise. They are the plan
for accomplishing the goal of workplace equality. In this Article, I
have defined sex as fantasy and sex discrimination as the (unwelcome) imposition of (sex) fantasy. In considering theories regarding the aggregation and disaggregation of sex (biological, explicit and non-explicit, gender, and sexual orientation), I have
4
See generally Susan M. Mathews, Title VII and Sexual Harassment:Beyond Damages Control,3 Yale J L & Feminism 299 (1991) (discussing role of damages in eliminating
sexual harassment).
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argued that the problem of sexual harassment law is not only
how sex is defined but that as a jurisprudential matter, courts
have accepted that some sex discrimination is acceptable. In particular, courts have accepted the legality of sexual harassment
that is not severe or pervasive with the aim of preserving the fantasy of normal male heterosexuality, an interpretation that is
contrary to the statute as amended. The Supreme Court should
eliminate the severe or pervasive consideration in the liability
phase of sexual harassment cases when there is no tangible job
consequence and construe the statute to achieve the goal of
equality.

